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International Court of Justice

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Official Transcript of the International
Military Tribunal in the matter of The
United States of America, the French
Republic, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
against Hermann Wilhelm Goering et al,
Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany,
on 20 June 1946, 1000-1700.
Lord Justice Lawrence presiding.

THE PRESIDENT: I have an anouncement to make. In the first place, supplementary witnesses will be heard at the end of the case for the Defendants. Secondly, interrogatories and other documents received by that time must be offered in evidence then. Thiedly, interrogatories and other documents allowed before the end of the evidence but received at a later date will be received and considered by the Tribunal up to the end of the trial. That is all.

ALBERT SPEER - Resumed

DIRECT EXAMINATION- Continued

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q We talked about the utilization of labor industry, and now we shall turn to the question of how labor was introduced into industry; that is, the special demands put.

Mr. Speer. in your testimony of the 18th of October, 1945, you stated, first of all, that you demanded new laborers fron Sauckel and you demanded them rather explicitly and, secondly. that you knew that among these laborers there would be foreigners; thirdly, that you had known that some of these foreign workers were working in Germany against their will. Will you please comment on this statement?

A This voluntary statement is quite correct. During the war I was a very grateful to Sauckel for all laborers and workers which he put at my disposal, and many a time I held him responsible for the fact that through a lack or deficiency of workers achievements were not met. I always emphasized the merits which accrued to him because of his activity, merits toward armament.

Q Now, in your testimony of the 18th of October, '45, and now again, you mention workers. Do you mean the total concept of workers, that is German workers, foreigners from occupied countries, and foreigners from friendly or annexed states, and prisoners of war?

A Yes. Beginning with the middle of 1943, I had differences with Sauckel regarding the policy of production and about the lack of reserves of German labor which was at my disposal; but that has nothing whatever to do with my general

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attitude toward Sauckel's work.

Q What percentage of the total laborer was the responsibility of Sauckel?

A You mean the total labor supply?

Q Yes.

A Up until August, 1944 -- that is up until the period of time when I took over air armament as well -- perhaps thirty to forty per cent of all workers which were at our disposal. Of course the largest part of them were German worke When, in 1944, I took over air armament as well -- that was in August of 1944-- I had no appreciable demand for workers because, since the ramifications of the bomber attacks on communications and transportation in the Reich, the armament production had markedly declined.

Q Was your need for workers unlimited or tremendously high?

A No. The magnitude of armament and entire production and the corresponding need for workers was governed by our raw material supply.

Q That meant your need was restricted to the availability of raw materials?

A My need for workers had its top limits determined by raw materials.

Q There is a marked increase in production figures for armament, which was reached under you. In order to achieve this increase, did the workers used increase in numbers as well?

A No. From 1942 to 1944 production was multiplied seven times as far as arms was concerned, armored vehicles five times. and general munitions six times. The number of workers in these brackets was increased by only thirty per cent. This success was not brought about through a higher utilization or exploitation of labor but rather through the doing away with various methods of production and through an improved system of planning and coordinating the armament industr and production.

Q What do you mean by the concept "production for war", "Kriegsproduktion"?

A The concept which is frequently used here, "production for war", is nothi different from the ordinary concept of production. It comprised everything which is fabricated industrially or in a business-like manner, including the civilian needs.

Q What did you mean in Germany by the concept of "armaments"? What did that include?

A The concept of "armament" in no way restricted itself to that sphere which was delineated through the Geneva Convention. The modern concept of "armaments " is a much more extensive and comprehensive one, It includes a sphere of much greater and much more extensive activity. In Germany, for the concept of "armaments" there were no basic principles set down, but the characteristics of the armament industry was that the Armament Inspectorate took care of it and watched over it. In Germany, for instance, the entire production of raw steel belonged to it, our foundaries, melting institutions, the production or the fabrication of aluminum and modern synthetic materials, chemicals, the bringing about of synthetic rubber or nitrogen, the production of synthetic wool, the fabrication of single parts, about which you can not say they are to be used in armament alone, such as ball bearings, gears, valves and so forth, or the production of tools; the establishing of chain production systems and the construction of commercial ships, of locomotives, heavy machinery, textile concerns, and concerns which worked with wood and leather.

In the interrogatories which I sent to my witnesses, I tried to determine what the percentage was, the figures of how many German industries produced armaments applicable to the Geneva Convention, and I should like to give you the figures. My co-workers agree to a man that between 14 and 20 per cent of our armament program concerned itself with the production of planes, weapons, warships or the general equipment which the various branches of the Wehrmacht required. The bulk of the material, therefore, was not armament in the sense of the Geneva Convention, and the reason for the expansion of the concept of armament in Germany was the preferential treatment which applied to these industries, treatment which resulted in numerous industries pressing to be called armament industries.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, in the interrogatories which have not been submitted to the Tribunal because the book is not ready, the witness Sauer, under figures 7 and 10, the witness Schieber under figures 6 to 9, and the witness Kerrl under figures 4 to 7, concern themselves with the restrictions as applied to the concept of armament.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Mr. Speer, just by way of example, you know the concern Krupp at Essen. How far did this concern produce armament equipment in the sense of the Geneva prisoner of war agreement, that is, weapons, munitions, and objects which are necessary for direct conduct of war?

A This concern Krupp is an example of the fact that an armament concern will devote only a fraction of its productivity to war. Of course, I must point out the fact that this concern, the firm of Krupp, was one of those armament industries which participated least of all on a percentage basis in armament production.

With Krupp, mines were concerned, and there were three large works which concerned themselves with the production of steel. They comprised the main factors of production at Krupp. There was the manufacture of locomotives and some work to be done for chemical purposes. These were some of the specialties of Krupp.

On the other hand, during the war the actual armament specialty of Krupp was the building of armored towers for warships, and special guns. That was a facility which they had, but which they did not utilize. In the year 1944, Krupp erected the first works for the production of guns. Up until that time, Krupp concerned himself in the main with the development or the building of new weapons, and then the fabrication was turned over to other firms.

To summarize, one can say that at Krupp's, 10 to 15 per cent of the personnel turned out armament equipment in the sense of the Geneva prisoner of war agreement, even though the entire works was considered a war industry.

Q What influence did you and your ministry have as to whether an industry would receive German or foreign workers?

A My ministry had no influence in that direction at all. The need for workers was reported by the industries which were subordinate to me. I received a total figure of workers needed, but there was no special segregation as to German or foreign workers. This total figure was transmitted to the General Plenipotentiary for Labor. Sauckel refused to take over detailed demands, and he was quite right in this matter, for he could not issue detailed directives to the offices which were subordinate to him, that is, dealing with the percentage of German or foreign workers which were to be allocated to the various industries.

The recruitment and the distribution of workers to industries was taken care of by the labor offices without any intervention of my offices or agencies. Therefore, in this case we did not exert influence as to whether Germans, prisoners of war, or foreigners were allocated to any special industry. The industry then had to report back to us about the number of workers that they had received. This report was turned in to my ministry in a total or lump figure so that I had no knowledge of the number of foreign workers or prisoners of war contained in the total figure. Of course, I knew that foreign workers worked on armament equipment, and I quite agreed with that.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, for the assistance of the Tribunal I would like to remark that figures 7 and 17 of the interrogatory of the witness Schmelte, and figures 1 and 8 of the same interrogatory deal with these questions. In the interrogatory of Schieber, numbers 10, 11, 30 and 31 apply to this point. Both of these witnesses deal with these questions in their interrogatories. Furthermore, in the interrogatory deposed by Kerrl, numbers 8 and 9 apply to this point, and relevant material is contained therein.

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BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Mr. Speer, who was responsible for demanding the manpower needed for armament from the Plenipotentiary General for Manpower?

A Those who demanded the workers, the pwople who put the demands, were distributed according to demands in the various economic sectors, There were perhaps 15 different sectors whic placed their demands. I placed demands for army and navy armament and for building, and beginning with September of 1943, for the sectors of chemisty, mining, and the balance of production. Air armament had its special labor department, and their demands were voiced by the Reichsluftfahrt Ministerium, the Reich Air Ministy.

DR. FLAECHSNER: In his interrogatory, the witness Schmelte has dealt with this matter in his answer to figure 2; the witness Schieher in his answer to figures 2, 3, and 5 concerns himself with this point also. Then the witness Kerrl deals with this matter in figures 2 and 3 of his interrogatory.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Weren't the demands for workers for these three branches of the Wehrmacht centralized in your Ministry?

A No. Of course, in form, beginning with March of 1941, I had tden over the Armament Office from General Thomas, and this office was a common or joint office of all three Wehrmacht branches and labor questions were discussed. Through an agreement between Goering and myself, we had established that air armament should be independent of my ministry and should look out for its own interests.

This agreement was necessary since first of all I was the Minister for Armament and had my own interests, and since he wanted to make decisions of his own regarding labor power about a unit that was not subordinate to me.

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Q. In how far are you responsible for supplying work to prisoners of war in armament, a matter which is dealt with in the Geneva Convention?

A. I did not exert my influence that prisoners of war be employed contrart to the directive given out by the OKW. I knew the point of view held by the OKW and according to which the Geneva Convention was to be strictly observed. Of course, I knew as well, that these Geneva Conventions and regulations did not apply to Russian prisoners of war and Italian internees. I could not exert any influence on the allocation of prisoners of war to the various industries. This allocation was determined by the Labor Office in connection with the lower levels of the prisoner of war system with the so-called Stalag. That was a matter that was handled by them.

Q. In this connection I should like to refer to the interrogatory of the witness Schmelte and his reply as given under figure 14.

Mr. Speer, who was the decisive officer who was under the OKW and who made decisions?

A. The supervision of the actual usage and employment of prisoners of war was carried out through the economy officer (Wirtschaftsoffizier) and that was incorporated into the system of the Wehrkreisbefehlshaber and was under the jurisdiction of the army.

Q. The Prosecution has submitted an affidavit by Mr. Duess, who is an American statistics expert. This is document 2520-PS.

According to this affidavit, as pertaining to armament production, four hundred thousand prisoners of war were employed. These figures supposedly originate from statistics in your ministry. Will you comment on this figure?

A. The figures are well-known to me on the basis of my activity as a minister and they are correct. In this figure of four hundred thousand prisoners of war we are concerned with the total number of prisoners of war employed in armament production.

It is an incorrect conclusion drawn from this affidavit if we are to assume that these prisoners of war were connected with the production of munitions along the lines of the Geneva Convention. Statistics applying to the number of prisoners of war employed in those industries which produced goods in in compliance with the Geneva Convention, such statistics were not kept and it is a figure that cannot be deduced from my figures.

Apart from that in this figure of four hundred thousand prisoners of war two to three hundred thousand Italian military internees are counted in who at that time were brought into the sphere of my activity and production at the time. This affidavit does not prove that prisoners of war were concerned with the production of war products and munitions, as such.

Q. The Central Planning Board is mentioned in this connection. You were a member of this Board. Can you picture the origin of the Central Planning Board and its sphere of activity and go into detail?

A. When in 1942 I assumed my office it was an urgent necessity that the allocation and distribution of various materials be centralized for the three branches of the Wehrmacht and that the direction of war economy in the long run be guaranteed. Up until that time this matter had been taken care of in the Ministry of Economy and some of the duties were carried on in the OKW. Both of these agencies were much too weak to make their will prevail against the three parts of the Wehrmacht.

On my proposal, in March of 1942 the Central Planning Board was established by the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan and the people who could make decisions were the three members, Milch, Koerner and myself. We could make decisions only through a common decision, a joint decision, which, however, could be brought about without any difficulty in every case. It is quite obvious that on the basis of my predominant position that I was the decisive man, the decisive factor in the Central Planning Board.

The tasks of the Central Planning Board were clearly deliniated and designated and the decree which I had drafted was set down and established by Goering in the form of a decree.

A coordination of the demands for labor allocation of workers was not a matter which was incorporated in this decree. This activity was not carried through systematically by the Central Planning Board despite the documents which have been presented here. But I tried, as far as the decisions regarding demands and allocation of labor was concerned, to have that decision made by me since this was an essential factor in the direction and managing of the entire economy. However, Sauckel always refused on this point because he considered that I was interfering or intervening in his rights.

DR. FLAECHSNER: I should like to submit the decree of Goering regarding the establishment of a Central Planning Board, under the Four Year Plan. It was published on the 25 April, 1942 and this shall be Speer document number 2, Exhibit number 7. I should like to submit this.

Mr. President, this document may be found on page 17 of the English document book.

The sphere of the activity of the Central Planning Board --

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. What number are giving to it? On the document here it has Speer number 142.

DR. FLAECHSNER: No, Mr. President, that must be a typographical error. It should be 42, Mr. President. The "one" should be struck out.

THE PRESIDENT: What is the exhibit number?

DR. FLAECHSNER: Speer Exhibit number 7.

THE PRESIDENT: What does 42 mean? What is the point of putting 42 on it if its Exhibit number 7?

DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, that is the number according to which the document was admitted, when we compiled out document book. However, the exhibit number, number 7, is the decisive number in this case.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. FLAECHSNER: The other number is only used for the assistance in finding this document more readily. It is on page 17 of the English text and on this occasion I should like to call the attention of the High Tribunal to figure three of this decree, according to which the Central Planning Board had to decide about all industrial matters, about raw materials, about the distribution of raw materials and the inclusion of demands of the total economy and of the transportation system. This decree does not contain any regulation about workers and workers' problems.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q. Mr. Speer, how did it come about that despite this labor demands were discussed in the Central Planning Board?

A. All of the sixteen meetings of the Central Planning Board which took place from 1942 until 1945, those minutes are contained in the stenographic records. These five thousand typed pages give a clear picture of the activities carried on and show the activities and the sphere of activity of the Central Planning Board. Any expert can see from that there was no planning with regard to manpower. It is quite clear that a plan regarding labor would have to be carried through at least on a three month basis, a system which we [illegible] to follow in regard to the plans as to raw materials. In fact in the Central Planning Board three to four meetings did take place which concerned themselves with labor. These three or four discussions came about in the following manner. They were held for the following reasons:

In the years 1942 and 1943--that is before I took over the management of the total economy, when soldiers were taken into the Wehrmacht, I had reserved for myself the right to distribute and allocate the various recruitment quotas among the various sectors. This distribution was discussed in the Central Planning Board because it was considered a neutral topic. At this session, of cours there was a representative of the General Plenipotentiary for Labor, since at the same time the problem of replacements had to be dealt with. Another problem which was discussed in the Central Planning Board on another sector was the distribution and allocation of coal for the following year. As it was in Englan coal was the decisive factor in our war production. At these discussions we had to determine at the same time how the demands for labor supply for the mines could be satisfied because only when there were promises that could be kept could we make plans which could be carried through for the following year. From this discussion resulted the use of Russian prisoners of war in mines, a matter which has been mentioned here.

Two sessions took place in which the demands put forward by all interested parties were discussed. They were discussed in the way the Prosecution would like to generalize in regard to the sessions of the Central Planning Board. These sessions took place in February and March of 1944, and neither before no after were these sessions ever repeated. These two sessions took place during my illness. At that time I was not quite clear why Sauckel at first complied with my wish to have the Central Planning Board put under my ministry and then later on went back on his promise.

Q The Prosecution has shown various extracts dealing with sessions of the Central Planning Board. Are these extracts, as far as you know, from the stenographic record, or are they taken from the minites?

A They are taken from the stenographic records, minutes were set up deali with the results of the meeting, and these minutes are the actual results of th meeting. From the minutes themselves the Prosecution has thus far submitted no material. The matters contained in the stenographic record and the material th has been submitted here are, of course, remarks and debates which always take place when matters of such importance are dealt with, in every war economy of every country, even when the authorities involved are not directly responsible, as in the use of manpower.

Q Therefore, are these quotations which were put before the High Tribunal concerned with decisions which were made in the Central Planning Board or made to you?

A I have already answered that.

Q Now I should like to put to you one more question . You had another special function in the Four Year Plan?

A I was the Armaments Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan, and in March 1942, on my proposal, Goering established this office, and I was the one who was charged with this office. This was purely a matter of form. It was generally known that Goering had quarrelled with my predecessor, Todt, since armaments problems had not been subordinated to him, and in assuming this capacity as Armaments Plenipotentiary, I had subordinated myself to Goering. In actual fact, the Armaments Plenipotentiary was not effective in any way. I issued no directives in that capacity, In my capacity as Minister, I had sufficient authority, and it was not necessary that I use any authority which I might have had under the Four Year Plan.

DR. FLAECHSNER: For the assistance of the High Tribunal, when we deal with the question of the Central Planning Board, perhaps I might refer to the fact that the witness Schieber in his interrogatory under figure (4) and (45), and the witness Kerrl in his interrogatory under figure (2) have made statements and have testified in this connection.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Now I shall turn to the question of the responsibility for the number of foreign workers in general. Mr. Speer, the Prosecution charges you with co-responsibility for the entire figure of foreign workers who were transported to Germany. Your co-defendant Sauckel has testified in this connection that he work for you, first of all, in this matter and that his activity in the final analysi was determined by your needs. Will you please comment on this?

A Of course, I expected Sauckel to meet the demands of war production, but it is quite out of the question that he took care of my demands, for, beginning with the spring of 1943, I received only a part of the workers I needed. If my highest demands and figures had been met, I would have received all of them. I need cite but one example. Some 200,000 Ukranian women were made available for housework, and it is quite certain that I was of the opinion that they could be put to better use in armaments production.

It is also clear that the German labor reserve had not been utilized fully. Beginning with January 1943 these German reserves were still on hand in ample degree. I was interested in having German workers--and, of course, women--and this non-utilization of German reserves meant that I could not be responsible for the demands for foreign workers.

DR. FLAECHSNER: I should like to point out that the following witnesses have made statements in connection with this question: The witness Schmelte deals with points 12, 13 and 16 in an interrogatory. The witness Schieber, in reply to figure 22. The witness Roland in figure 1 and 4, and the witness Kerrl under figure 9. They have testified on points relating to this problem.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Mr. Speer, if you or your office demanded workers, then, of course, you knew that you would receive foreign workers among the number. Did you need these foreign workers?

A I needed them only for a part of my work. For instance in the matter of coal, the coal mines could not function without Russian prisoners of war. It would have been quite impossible to meet the demands with German workers, who consisted mainly of female labor, and there were, furthermore, special areas in which it was desirable to have foreign workers, but the majority of the needs could be met through German workers and German female workers. The war production of England and America and of the Soviet Union--all of these countries--followed the same principle.

THE PRESIDENT: Can't you go on, Dr. Flaechsner? There is no need to wait.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Yes. I shall return to this point in more detail when I come to my document.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Mr. Speer, I should like to return to your testimony of the 18th of October, 1945, once more. On that occasion you stated several times that you knew that the workers from occupied countries were being used and brought to Germany against their will. The prosecution alleges that you approved of the use of force and of terror. Willyou comment on that?

A As to the method according to which workers were recruited -- I had no influence upon that. If the workers were brought to Germany against their will -- I mean by that, that they were obligated, by law, to work for Germany. Whether these legal measures were justified or not, that was a matter I did not check into at the time, and of course it wasnot any concern of mine to do so. As far as the application of force and terror is concerned -- I mean by that police measures such asraids and arrests, and matters of that kind. I did not approve of these violent means, and that may be seen from the attitude I held and the discussion I had with Lammers on the 11th of June, 1944.

At that time I held the view that neither an intensification of police power, nor raids, nor measures of force or violence, were correct or just. In this document I am mentioned, at the same time, asone who expressed misgivings and objections to these violent measures.

THE PRESIDENT: Where is the document?

DR. FLECHSNER: Mr. President, that is document 3819-PS, which the prosecution used in the cross-examination of the defendant Keitel, I believe it was, and of the defendant Sauckel. They submitted that document at that time. I did not incorporate it in my document book.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Mr. Speer, why were you against measures of that kind, measures using violence?

A Because through measuresof that kind the regular manpower supply in the occupied countries would have to be destroyed. I wasinterested in having a regulated order of production in the occupied countries. Measures of violence caused a loss of manpower to me from the occupied countries, because there was the danger that these people would flee to the woods in increasing numbers so that they would not have to go to Germany, and that they would strengthen the lines of the resistance movement.

This, in turn, led to increased sabotage measures and that, in turn, to a limiting or a restriction of production in the occupied countries.

Therefore, the military commanders-in-chief, and the commanders of the army groups, as well as myself, again and again protested against measures of violence on a large scale.

Q As far as the recruiting of workers from various countries was concerned, were you especially interested in that, and if so, why?

A Yes. As far as the labor recruitment from France, Belgium and Holland was concerned -- that is, countries in the West -- and workers from Italy, that was the recruitment I was especially interested in because the General Plenipotentiary for Manpower, beginning with the spring of 1943, had set down and established that in the main the workers from these regions would be at the disposal of war production. On the other hand, the workers from the East were to be used for agriculture, for regular industry, and for the building of railroads.

This matter was repeatedly put to me by Sauckel, especially in the year 1944.

DR. FLECHSNER: In this connection, Mr. President, I should like to refer to document 3012-PS, which is USA Exhibit 190. This document is found on page 19 of the English text, and page 16 of the French text. I should like to quote from a conference of the Economic Inspectorate South, in Russia:

"Staatsrat Peukert" -- the delegate for Sauckel in Russia -- "states in the introduction that the labor commitment in the German agriculture and the armament programs ordered by the Fuehrer" -- he states that workers from the West, especially those skilled workers required by Minister Speer, should be made available to the armament industry.

Document 1289-PS, which is exhibit number RF-71, may be found on page 42 of the English text, and page 39 of the French and German texts. Here we are concerned with a remark by Sauckel, on the 26th of April, 1944, and I quote:

"Only by a renewed mobilization of reserves in the occupied Western territories can the urgent need of German armament for skilled workers be satisfied. For this purpose the reserves from other territories are not sufficient either in quality or in quantity. They are urgently needed for the requirements of agriculture, transportation, and construction. Up to 75 percent of the workers from the West have always been allocated to armament."

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flaechsner, speaking for myself, I don't know what the problem is that you are trying to solve, or what argument you are putting forward in the very least. I don't know what relevance this has at all. What does it matter whether they came from the West or whether they came from the East? I understand your argument, or the defendant's argument, that the armament industry, under the Geneva Convention, does not include a variety of branches of industry which go eventually into armament, and it only relates to things which are directly concerned with munitions. But when you have placed that argument before us, what is the good of referring us to this sort of evidence?

I mean, I only want to know because I don't understand in the least what you are getting at.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, this is in preparation for the question to which we are now turning, and that is the question of the Speer industries, or the S industries, of these blocked industries, if I may put it that way. Speer wanted to stop the transportation of workersfrom the West into Germany. Therefore, in advance, I have to establish that up to that point his workers, in the main, came from the West. I should like to establish that up until that time.--

THE PRESIDENT (Interposing): Supposing he did want to stop them from coming from the West; what difference doesit make?

DR. FLAECHSNER: Speer is charged with and accused of the fact that he was active and participated in the deportation of workers from the West, workers which were used in his armament industries. Of course, the date is the important point.

He says that beginning with the year 1943 he followed a different policy from what he had pursued before. Before that time, as we have seen from the evidence, the workers who had come to Germany up until that time, to a large extent, had been voluntary workers.

THE PRESIDENT: Of course, if you can prove that they were all voluntary workers it would be extremely material, but you are not directing evidence to that at all.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, this is the final reason for this evidence, and I should like to carry it on to that end.

THE PRESIDENT: I am only telling you that I don't understand what that end is.

Go on; don't wait any further.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Mr. Speer, the General Plenipotentiary for Labor named Italy and the occupied Western countries as the countries from which the laborers would come into Germany for armament industries.

How did you endorse Sauckel's measures in these countries; to what extent, and how long?

A Up until the spring of 1943 I completely endorsed these measures of his. Up until that period of time no obvious disadvantages had resulted for me. However, beginning with the spring of 1943, the refusal of workers to go to Germany increased among the workers of the West. That may be connected with our defeat at Stalingrad and with the intensified air attacks on Germany.

Up until the spring of 1943, to my knowledge, the labor commitments were met more or less voluntarily. However, beginning with the spring of 1943, only a part of the workers who had been called up, and who were being recruited, came voluntarily to the places to which they were to report.

Therefore, beginning about the beginning of June, 1943, through the Military Commander-in-Chief in France, I established the so-called Sperr Betriebe Belgium, Holland and Italy soon followed suit in establishing these industries; that is, Sperr Betriebe, or S industries. It was important that each of the workers employed in one of these blocked industries, Sperr Betriebe, automatically was excluded from recruitment and commitment in Germany; and any worker who was recruited to go to Germany was free to go into a blocked industry, or an S industry, in his own country without the labor authorities having the possibility of taking this man out of the S industry that he had entered.

Q What consequences did this matter have on the recruitment of laborers in the occupied Western countries?

A After the establishment of the S industries, the labor commitment from the West into Germany decreased to a small fraction. Before that, eighty to a hundred thousand workers came from France into Germany. After the establishment of these blocked industries, or the S industries, this figure decreased to three to four thousand a month, which is an insignificant figure. This may be seen from document RF-22.

It is obvious, and we have to state the facts, that the decrease in these figures was also brought about through the resistance movement which, at that time, began to expand considerably in the West.

Q At this period of time, did you and your offices endorse the policies followed by Sauckel?

9 A No. The first serious differences arose at this time, especially about the blocking of these workers in relation to labor commitments in Germany. This came about through the fact that the loss of workers, whom I had working in production in the occupied countries, was larger than the number of workers who came to Germany from the occupied countries of the West.

This may be seen from document RF-22.

In the year 1943, and especially in the first half of the year, perhaps four hundred thousand workers were transported from France to Germany. The production of France, however, decreased by eight hundred thousand workers, and the French workers in France, who worked for Germany, decreased by four hundred and fifty thousand workers.

Q Why did you demand, in the summer of 1943, the taking over of the entire German production from the Minister of Economics?

A According to my opinion, there was a considerable reserve present in German production, since the German peace economy had not been converted into a war economy on a large enough scale. In my opinion, the supply of German wome workers was the largest source of labor that I could tap.

Q What did you undertake when the Ministry of Economy gave the matter of total economy to your sphere of work ?

A At that time, I had worked out the following plan already. In Germany a large part of industry was concerned with the production of so-called consumer goods. Consumer goods are, for instance, shoes, clothing, furniture, and other necessary articles for the civilian population and for the armed forces. In the occupied western territories, however, the means for supplying this were absent where the raw materials were lacking. These industries were lying idle, especially in the western territories, and they had a great potential.

In the carrying through of this plan, I took the raw materials which were produced in Germany, such as synthetic wool, out of the sphere of work of German industries and transplanted this phase to the west. One million workers in the final analysis were to be supplied with work in the country itself; and in this way I could use one million German workers for armament.

Q Did you not want to increase armament production in France as well ?

A No. All of these plans were not successful. Before the outbreak of the war, the French government did not succeed in establishing intensified armament production, and I also was unsuccessful in carrying through this plan.

Q What did you intend to do with this new plan ? What advantages did you expect to gain ?

A I shall try to be very brief. Through this plan, In Germany I could ear-mark certain industries for armament; and in that way I received not only workers, but also rooms, and administrative personnel. I also received electricity. Apart from that, these industries, since they never had been important for work, had not received any foreign workers. So in that way, almost exclusively, I received German workers whom I could use for my German production and whom I valued much more in armament production than any foreign workers.

Q Was this plan not detrimental to German armament production ?

A The disadvantages were much more important, since any ear-marking of an industry meant the taking away of a machine, and at the end of the war there would have to be a reconversion which would last at least six to eight months. At that time, at a Gauleiter meeting at Posen, I said that if we wanted to be successful in this war, we would have to be the ones who would have to make the greater sacrifices,

Q How was this plan made into reality ?

THE PRESIDENT : Dr. Flaechsner, what has the Tribunal got to do with the details of these plans ? What do we care whether his plans were efficient or whether they were inefficient ? The only question this Tribunal has to decide is whether they were legal in accordance with the Charter of international law. It does not matter to us whether his plans were good plans or bad plans, or what the details of the plans were, except insofar as they are legal or illegal.

DR. FLAECHSNER : Yes, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT : It is a mere waste of our time to go into the details of these plans.

DR. FLAECHSNER : In that way, I wanted to show that that the course followed by the defendant in later policy was to have the German reserves used for his own purposes; that is, the end purposes of armamert, and to have the foreign workers work in their own country.

THE PRESIDENT : But, Dr. Flaechsner, that is a question of efficiency, not of legality. What he is saying is that he had a lot of German workers, good workers, and they were producing consumer goods instead of producing armament goods. He thought it better to institute his industries so that the workers could remain in France or the other western countries.

What have we got to do with that ? If they were forced to work there, it is just as illegal as it is to be brought to Germany to be forced to work. At least, that is the suggestion that is made by the prosecution.

DR. FLAECHSNER : Yes, but I thought and believed--

THE PRESIDENT : (Interposing) The Tribunal will recess.

(A recess was taken)

THE PRESIDENT : The Tribunal will hear defendants' counsel at two o'clock tomorrow afternoon on the question of the apportionment of time for the defendants' counsel's speeches.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER :

Q Mr. Speer, please, will you tell us briefly, summarizing how you worked with Mr. Bichelonne, the French Minister of Economy, and how he agreed on the program; but, please, will you summarize this ?

A Immediately after taking over production in September 1943, I agreed, I arranged with Bichelonne that a program of removing goods from Germany to France should operate, which incidentally I have already described, and that the system should be introduced. Bichelonne , in a final conference, stated that he wasn't authorized to talk about labor employment with me but that to the contrary, Laval had expressly forbidden him to do so. He would have to point out, he said, that a continuation of recruitment of workers to the extent existing at the time would make impossible the program which had been introduced between us and I was of the same opinion. We agreed, therefore, that the entire production of France, beginning with gold, right up to the final product, should be declared "blocked enterprises", being blocked firms. In this connection, we were both perfectly aware of the fact that this would make almost impossible the recruitment of workers for Germany since, as I have already explained, it was free to every Frenchmann to go to one of these blocked firms once he had been called up for work in Germany. I gave Bichelonne my word that I should adhere to this principle for a lengthy period and in spite of all the difficulty which occurred, I kept that word to him.

DR. FLAECHSNER : Mr. President, in connection with this, I should like to quote from document R-124, which is USA Exhibit 179. It is on page 37 of the English document book. With this, we are concerned with a speech of Sauckel which has been touched upon frequently before the Central Planning Board and I shall only quote from it : " But my agencies on France stated to me the next time I came to France : Everything is at an end here, it is useless to go on; it is stated in all prefectures here : Minister Bichelonne has concluded an agreement with Minister Speer according to which only French workers are considered for employment in France and none of them need go to Germany any more. This coincided with the first large conference."

BY DR. FLAECHSNER :

Q Mr. Speer, which consequences arose for the labor program between Germany and France ?

A I have already answered that, that beginning with the first of October, recruiting of labor came to a complete end.

DR. FLAECHSNER : About the effect of this Speer-Bichelonne plan and the tendency pursued by Speer in connection with the various attempts to carry out this principle, I shall speak later on the strength of documents. At this moment I shall, therefore, discontinue the question on the subject and I shall confine myself to this. From the official French document, RF 22, which is on page 20 of the English text of my document book, page 17 of the German and French text, I shall quote. In this report it says and I quote : "Finally a real hostility started between Sauckel and Speer who was commissioned with the organization of forced labor in the occupied territories..." and then a few lines later : "The superiority of the first mentioned over the latter which made itself felt more and more during the last seven months of the occupation made the resistance against the removal much easier." This text shows that with the first mentioned and the military commander----

THE PRESIDENT : That is all cumulative; you have proved it three or four times already.

DR. FLAECHSNER : Very well, I shall not continue with it.

Q Only to rectify a mistake, Mr. Speer, I want to ask you about the document, that you had something to do with the organizing for forced labor with Frenchmen; is that true ?

A No, the organization of labor in France was not under my jurisdiction.

Q You have already hinted that this program of transfer of goods wasn't only confined to France. Will you tell me to which other countries that also applied ?

A I shall summarize right away the following questions : The program was extended to Belgium, Holland, Italy, Czechoslovakia, where all the entire production was also declared block, and these blocked firms were given the same protection regarding labor as had been given in France. After the meeting with Hitler on the 4th of January 1944, during which the new program for 1945 for the West was agreed upon, I adhered to this policy and the result was that during the first half of 1944, 33,000 workers came from France to Germany compared with five hundred thousand which had been planned during that conference and in other countries, too, only about ten percent of the proposed workers were taken to Germany.

Q How about the figures applying to workers from the Protectorate ?

A Everywhere there was only a fraction.

Q A document 1739-PS, Exhibit RF-10, has been submitted by the prosecution. It is on page 23 of the English text of my document book and it is a report from Sauckel, dated December 1942; also, there is a document 1290-PS, on page 24 of the English text which has also been submitted and these document appear to show that according to assertions of Sauckel's from the beginning of his activities until March 1943, there was an excess of laborers , of workers. Is that true ?

A Yes, that is true.

Document 16 PS, U.S.A. Exhibit 168, which is on Page 25 of the English text of my document book, also shows that Sauckel was not in favor of using German women in the armament industry, but in the summer of '42 several hundred thousand Ukranian girls were placed at the disposal of German householders.

These three documents, in their entirety, show that Speer, in his Ministry, was not responsible for the total figure of workers coming into Germany.

I should also like to present a document under No. 02, Exhibit No. 8. Mr President, it is given the number 02 in the document book and it is on Page 26 of the English. It refers to a meeting of the Central Planning Board.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flaechsner, you are not stating the exhibit numbers of any of these documents, so that you are not offering them properly in evidence at all. I mean you are referring now to 02, which is some numbering which we have got nothing whatever to do with.

DR. FLAECHSNER: May I then present this document as Exhibit No. 8?

THE PRESIDENT: What about No. 4? Oh, that is already in. Perhaps it would be well to submit a list afterwards, giving the proper exhibit numbers for all these documents you are referring to.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Yes, Mr. President, I shall certainly do that.

I should like to quote -- this is a remark made by Speer: "In this connection, it is necessary that we should get new German workers, unskilled labor, into the firm because I can not replace by foreigners the number which we have to give up as soldiers. The German supply becomes simply too scanty. In shell production there is now already one burst barrel after another and we do not know what is the cause. Cases of sabotage may be taking place. The measures which will have to be taken in order to switch at least one million Germans over to the armament industry are extremely hard and will, in my view, practically depress the whole living standard of the upper classes. This, therefore, means that we, roughtly speaking, are going to become proletarians for the duration of the war if it will last long. This matter has to be considered cooly and soberly. There is, therefore, no other way out."

This view of Speer, namely, of exploiting the workers' reserve within Germany to a larger degree, was not realized until the summer of 1944. There was an argument between Speer on one side and Sauckel and Gauleiters on the other. About this, the testimony of the witnesses in the interrogatories will speak. To assist the Tribunal, I should like to draw your attention to Schieber, question and answer 22; Roland's, it is question 2; Kerrl, it is No. 9; and in the case of Schmelte it is questions 13 and 16. Unfortunately, I can not give you the page numbers of the English book, Mr. President, because I haven't seen them yet.

THE PRESIDENT: What was the document you were referring to?

DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, the interrogatories which have been filled in are in the supplement volume of my document book and which I hope is now in the hands of the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes it is.

DR. FLAECHSNER: I should like to reserve the right to submit these documents at the end of my examination in total. I am only taking the liberty of referring to the points in which the witnesses are referring to [illegible]. About the different opinions presented by Sauckel and Speer, we are informed, through a conference of Speer, during a meeting of the Central Planning Board on the 21st of December, 1943 -- this is on Page 27 of the English text of my document book and it will be my Exhibit No. 9 -- I quote: -- "

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flaechsner, I thought I had made it clear to you that we are not concerned with the efficiency of inefficiency of these plans.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Very well, Mr. President.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q. Mr. Speer, there is an important document submitted by the prosecution It is the minutes of a meeting with Hitler on the 4th of January, 1944. I has been submitted as 1292 PS, USA Exhibit 225, Page 28 of the English text of my document book. How did the meeting come about?

A. It was called by request of Hitler.

Q. For what reason?

A. To settle the arguments between Sauckel and myself.

Q. And what was Hitler's decision?

A. His decision was a useless compromise, as was often the case with Hitler. These blocked firms were to be maintained, and Sauckel had the order given to himself that for this purpose three and a half million workers should be obtained from occupied territories. In this connection, Hitler gave severe instruction to OKW, the military commanders, and they were that Sauckel request should be met with every means.

Q. Did you agree to this decision?

A. No, not at all, because I had heard that the program of removal which I had drafted to the west had collapsed.

Q. And what action did you take after that?

A. Contrary to the Fuehrer's decision during that meeting, I informed the Military Commander in Paris, General Studt, in connection with the order from the OKW military commanders which was expected, that the two interpretations of the meeting would be on his desk. Since the Military Commander was agreeable to my interpretattion, it could be expected that he would follow my line of thought.

DR. FLAECHSNER: In this connection, may I present a document which is on Page 29 of the English text of my document book, Page 26 of the German and French text. This is a telephonic message from Speer to General Studt in Paris. It will be Exhibit No. 10. Two things appear from this letter. One, and I quote: "Gauleiter Sauckel will for the time being start negotiations with the appropriate agencies with regard to the occupied western territories, in order to clear up the manner and possibility of the execution -- "

THE PRESIDENT: What is the point in reading that, Dr. Flaechsner?

DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, the prosecution has referred to this document, 1292 PS, and they have attempted to prove with it --

THE PRESIDENT: He has told us the substance of the whole affair. We quite understand what the difference of opinion between Sauckel and Speer was.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Very well. This oducment will show the reaction on the part of the Defendant, namely, what he has done so that Hitler's decision, as such, would be contravened or at least weakened. In this letter the Defendant says to General Studt --

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Flaechsner, the Tribunal has given you the clearest possible indication of the view which they take about these matters of different plans and differences of view between Sauckel and Speer. Why don't you pass on to some other part of your case if there is any other part of it?

DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, I do not wish to discuss the argument between these two. I am trying to show the actions taken by Speer so as to put his point of view into practice. This isn't referring to --

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but that is irrelevant. As I said just now, the Defendant has told us what he did. It is not necessary to read it all out to us again.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Very well. In that case, may I go on to present a document which is on Page 30 of the English text of my document book, page 27 of the German and French text. Here we are concerned with a letter from Speer to Sauckel, dated January the 6th, 1944, and it is ascertained in this letter that for the firms working in the French industries 400,000 workers, plus 400,000 future workers, should be reserved during the following months which, therefore, would be removed from possible deportation.

Which results did these two letters have, Mr. Speer, with reference to Hitler's order that one million workers should be obtained from France and taken to Germany ?

A. I should like to summarize the entire subject and say few words about it. We had a system of dealing with uncomfortable orders from Hitler and how they could be got around. Jodl has already said in his testimony that he used that technique. Of course, the letters which are being submitted here are only recognizable to the connoisseur, the expert, regarding what they mean and which results they would have to have.

The document which is being presented now, from Sauckel's speech on the first of March 1944, also shows how these results became apparent in the labor program. The result is clear and I have already described it here, and I think we can therefore pass to page no. 49. That is, of course page 49 in our book.

Q. Mr. Speer, can you explain to me the situation regarding the results of air attacks on the traffic system in the occupied western territories ?

A. yes. In this connection I should again like to summarize a few questions.

The invasion was prepared for by considerable air attacks on the traffic net in the occupied western territories, and the result of that was that beginning in May and June 1944, production in France was paralyzed one million workers were unemployed. With that, the idea of removing production had collapsed as far as I was concerned, and after normal expectations of the departments in France, one was now under the impression that there would be a large air action towards Germany.

I gave the order that in spite of this paralysis of the French industry, the restricted or blocked firms should be kept up, although I knew as an expert that their restarting, considering the damage to the traffic net, wouldn't be possible in less than nine to twelve months even if the air attacks should cease. In this connection, therefore, I was acting against my own interests.

The French Prosecution have confirmed it in Document RF-22, which quotes the corresponding passages in the document book.

Between the 19th and 22nd of June I had a conference with Hitler and I obtained a decision, according to which the workers in the occupied territories should, in spite of the difficulties of transport, remain on the spot whatever happened. Seyss-Inquart has already testified that a similar decision was applied to Holland. Upon my orders, the workers in these blocked firms were even paid their wages.

DR. FLAECHSNER: In this connection I submit Speer Exhibit No. 12. It is an extract from the Fuehrer conference from the 19th to the 22nd of June 1944, and I beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice of it. It is on page 22 of the English text of my document book.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q. Mr. Speer, you would have had to be aware of the fact that with this decision which you made, at least one million workers would be unproductive for a lengthy period, that is to say, in all the western territories. How could you justify such a decision ?

A. I shall have to say quite openly that this was my first decision which had its inner justification in the war situation which had progressed catastrophically. The invasion had succeeded. The heavy air attacks on production were bringing decisive collapses, and with that an early end of the war had to foreseen. This was the cause of my realization that there was a new situation and the consequences I drew from this new situation will become apparent through various other examples which I shall bring up in the course of the trial.

Of course, Hitler was not of the same opinion during that period. He believed to the contrary, that everything ought to be done in order to utilize even the last strength.

Q. Will you please describe briefly your attitude towards the meeting of the 11th of July 1944, which we have already referred to once before. This is Document 3819-PS. Please be very brief.

A. During this meeting of the 11th of July, I maintained my point of view. It becomes apparent from the minutes that I announced the decision that the transport difficulties should not be allowed to influence production, and that therefore the blocked firms in these territories and I were perfectly aware of the fact that with this, the known results for these blocked firms would also be maintained, that is, the stopping of employment from occupied territories and transfer of it to Germany.

Q. The French Prosecution have presented a document No. 823. They presented it during the session of the 30th of May, if I remember correctly. It came up during the cross examination of co-defendant Sauckel.

According to this order, troops were to round up workers in the West. Please, will you briefly state your views on that. So as to refresh your memory, I want to say that in this telegram there is a reference to the meeting of the 11th of July.

A. The record of the meeting shows clearly enough that I opposed measures of force. I didn't see Keitel's actual order myself.

Q. No. 1824 is a document submitted by the French Prosecution on the same occasion. It is a document from General von Kluge dated the 25th of July 1944. It refers to the telegram from Keitel which has been previously mentioned. Do you know anything about the question of whether that order was ever actually carried out ?

A. I know that the order was not carried out. To appreciate the situation it is necessary that you should place yourself in the atmosphere prevailing during those days on or about the 20th of July. At that time, not every orde from the leaders was carried out. As the investigations after the 20th of July proved, Kluge, even at that time in his capacity as Supreme Commander in the West, was planning negotiations about a capitulation and probably he made his initial attempts during that time. That, incidentally, was also the reason for his suicide after the attempt of the 20th of July had failed.

THE PRESIDENT: You gave the number 1824. What does that mean ?

DR. FLAECHSNER: No. 824 is the number which the French Prosecution have given to this document. That is the number under which they have submitted it. Unfortunately, I cannot ascertain the exhibit number. I have made inquiries, but I haven't had an answer yet.

I am just given to understand that it is RF-1515. That is its exhibit number.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

A. (continuing): It is out of the question that Field Marshal Kluge at that moment, in that military situation, considering hiw views, should have given orders for forcible measures and raids which, according to the Sauckel-Laval agreement which was mentioned in the document, have no practical significance, since the blocked firms remained in force, and this could therefore not become effective.

This was well known to the authorities in France, and the best proof for this fact, namely that the order wasn't carried out, is Document RF-22 of the French Prosecution which shows that in July 1944 only 3,000 workers came to Germany from France. If there had been forcible measures by the military, it would have been easy to produce a very much larger figure instead of the 3,000 workers and bring them from France to Germany.

Q Did you use your influence to stop completely the transfer of laborers from occupied territories in Germany?

A No. I shall have to tell you openly that I did use my influence to reduce the recruitment of laborers or to stop measures of foce and raids but I did not use it to stop the employment of labor completely.

Q I shall now pass to another subject.

The Prosecution has touched upon and mentioned the origination Todt. Can you explain to the Tribunal the organization Todt?

A Here again I shall summarize somewhat. The organization Todt only had technical tasks, that is to say they had to carry out technical construction work in the east, particularly road construction and rail construction, and in the west the construction of concrete shelters such as we used in the so-called Atlantic Wall. for this purpose the organization Todt used, to an a considerable degree, foreign workers. In the west there were about twenty foreigners to one German worker. In Russia there were about four foreigners, four Russians, to one German. This could only be carried out if the organization Todt in the west could use local builders and their staffs to a considerable extent and if they supplied the technicians and technical leaders. These firms recruited their own workers and it is clear that these firms had no possibility of recruiting by force.

It is due to this, therefore, that a large number of workers, people working for The Todt organization were volunteers. But it is also clear that a certain percentage were working in the Todt organization under the calling-up system.

The organization Todt has here been described as part of the armed forces and it is merely necessary to state in this connection that foreign workers did not, of course, come under it but that only German workers were part of it in that respect, and who, of course, in occupied territories had to become members of the armed forces in some way or other. Of course, the Prosecution had a different view of this.

Apart from the organization Todt there were certain transport units attached to my ministry who were working in occupied territories and it is for a certain reason that I am anxious to state that they were principally and always recruited as volunteers. The Prosecution have alleged that the organization Todt was the all-inclusive organization for all military construction work in the occupied territories and that is not the case. They had from one quarter to one fifth of the building program as their task.

In May 1944 the organization Todt was taken over by the Reich since Todt was being made responsible for so large a scale a construction program and the management of the apparatus by the General Plenipotentiary in the Four Year Plan for building occurred. This Plenipotentiary for building was responsible for the tasks he received from the Central Planning Board and he was responsible for the general direction but he was not responsible for the carrying out and supervision of the actual building. Through this the authority was in the Reich and in particular the SS building administration was acting on their own initiative and responsibility in connection with the building program which they were carrying out.

Q The prosecution have alleged that you had caused the employment of concentration camp inmates in German armament industry and that is document RF 24, US Exhibit 179, which was submitted to the Tribunal.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, this document is on page 47 of the English text in my document book. It is a conference with Hitler in 1942.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q How did that conference come about Mr. Speer?

A When in February 1942 I took over there were demands for considerable increases everywhere; amongst them the necessity for certain construction of new factories. In this connection Himmler was offering his concentration camps, both to Hitler and myself. It was his plan that within the concentration camps some of these necessary new constructions should be erected, together with the necessary machinery, under the supervision of the SS. The chief of the armament department of the armed forces, Colonel General Fromm was against this plan and so was I. Apart from general reasons, there was the point that uncontrolled production on the part of the SS should be prevented. Secondly, one had to expect that the techinal supervision in these firms would be removed from my jurisdiction. For that reason, when planning the extention program of armament in the spring of 1942, I did not take into consideration these demands by the SS at all. Himmler went to Hitler and the minutes of this conference, which is available here, is the defense against the wishes which Hitler pronounced following Himmler's proposal.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, in this connection I should like to draw your attention to page 44 of the German text, which is page 45 of the English text. It is point 36 of a Fuehrer protocol.

THE PRESIDENT: It is page 47 of the English text.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Yes, that is correct.

There it says, and I quote:

"Beyond a small number of workers it will not be possible to organize armament production in the concentration camps."

THE PRESIDENT: The witness has just given us the substance of it, has he not?

DR. FLAECHSNER: Yes.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Mr. Speer, according to this document you were proposing that factories should be staffed entirely by internees from concentration camps. Did you carry that out?

A No, it was not carried out in this form because it was soon clear that it was Himmler's intention to influence these businesses and insome way or other he would, no doubt, have succeeded in getting jurisdiction over these firms entirely. For that reason, in principle, only a part of the firm or the staff would consist of internees from concentration camps so as to work against Himmler's aims. Thus, the labor camps came about that were attached to the armament firms. The participation of five to eight per cent in arms and armament production which had been planned was something that was never handed over to Himmler and was due to an agreement with the general of the Army Staff in the OKW, General Buhle.

DR. FLAECHSNER: In that case may I draw your attention to page 48 of the English text in my document book which is document 1584-PS. It is U.S. Exhibit 221. It is a letter from Himmler to Goering, dated 9 March, 1944 and there it says that Himmler is emphasizing that if the possibility of the SS would be extended then there would be a speeding up and an increase in the results from these firms. The accompanying letter from Pohl to Himmler shows that there is the aim to supervise and control the employment of concentration camp inmates and that the SS is even to be used as the responsible work leader which was to be proposed. The increased employment of internees in other firms would, according to his experience and knowledge, not be sufficient and the SS wished therefore to supervise and control the employment of these people in those firms.

This document shows something else, however; namely it confirms the testimony of the defendant Speer that inmates of concentration camps were also paid premiums if they proved themselves particularly useful.

It shows on the last page that on an average the working hours of all detainees was 240 hours per month, which corresponds to sixty hours per week.

I also refer to a document which has already been mentioned yesterday, it is number 44 and has already been submitted by me as Exhibit number 6 and it is in the second volume of my document book. It is on page 88. Mr. President, it is the first document in the appendix volume.

This document shows clearly how much the extension of the SS economic firms was a matter of Himmler's and Pohl's ambition. The document also makes clear, and I quote:

"The working hours contributed by concentration camp inmates monthly did not amount to even 8,000,000 hours, so that most certainly not more than about 32,000 men and women from concentration camps can be working in our armaments establishments. This amount is constantly diminishing."

Mr. President, this sentence is on page 90, at the bottom.

The letter also shows that the author gives nearly the same number of hours with reference to output as is mentioned by Pohl in his letter; namely 250 hours per month, which is approximately 63 hours per week.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Mr. Speer, through this letter you had knowledge of the fact that workers, particularly foreigners, were not returning to their old places of work after they had come in contact with the police for certain acts but that they were taken to concentration camps. What steps did you take?

A Here again I should like to summarize several questions right away. I received the letter on or about 15 May in Berlin during my illness, and its contents upset me a great deal because, after all, this is nothing other than kidnapping. I had an estimate submitted to me about the number of people who would be removed from the economic system in this manner.

Thereupon I got in touch with the Central Planning Board on 22May 1944, and I demanded that the workers, even if they were taken east, should nevertheless be returned to their own firms at once. This remark, as such, is not logical, because, naturally, the number of crimes in the individual firms was very low, so that such a measure was not practical, but what I wished to express through it in any case was that the workers would have to go back to their own places of work. This statement from the Central Planning Board has been submitted by the Prosecution.

Immediately after the meeting with the Central Planning Board I went to see Hitler, and there I had a conference on 5 June 1944, and the minutes of the conference are available. I stated that I would not stand for any such thing, and I cited many reasons of being reasonable, since any other arguments would not have been effective. Hitler stated to me, as the record shows, that the workers would at once have to be returned to their old professions, and after a conference between Hitler and Himmler and myself he would once again communicate this decision of his to Himmler.

DR. FLAECHSNER: In this connection, Mr. President, I submit Exhibit 13, which is extracts from the Fuehrer conference of 5 June 1944, which you will find on page 92.

THE WITNESS: Immediately after the results of the conference were clear, I went to see Himmler and communicated to him Hitler's decision. He told me that no such number had ever been arrested by the police but he told me that he would immediately issue a decree which would correspond to Hitler's demands; namely, that these workers would no longer be detained by the SS.

I informed Hitler of the outcome of this conference, and I asked him that he should once again get in touch with Himmler about it. In those days I had no reason to distrust Himmler's statement because, after all, it is not customary for Reich Ministers to distrust each other so much, but I did not have any further complaints from my associates in this respect, and I must emphasize that the settling of the entire matter was not really my affair but that the information appeared so incredible to me that I decided to intervene at once.

Had I know that Himmler, eighteen months before, had started a very similar action, and that in this letter -- a letter which has been submitted here --

DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, this is document 1063-PS, and it is USA Exhibit 219. I have reproduced it on page 51 of the English text of my document book. That is the document to which the witness is now referring.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q How far did you make efforts to get workers for the armaments industry from concentration camps?

A Wait a minute. I should like to say something about the document.

Had I known this earlier, I would never had had the confidence in Himmler that he would correctly obey his order upoh Hitler's instructions because this letter shows quite clearly that this action was to be kept a secret. Only the Plenipotentiary for Labor and my own service department could receive this order.

Finally, I want to say in connection with this subject that it was my

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duty to interest myself as Armaments Minister in the use of any workers who were available for war production and armaments. I considered it proper that workers from concentration camps should also work in war production or armament industries.

The allegation by the Prosecution, however, that I deliberately increased the number of concentration camp detainees or that I caused their employment is by no means correct. I was interested in just the opposite from the point of view of the production in which I was interested.

DR. FLAECHSNER: May I remark in this connection that I have asked the witness Schmelte under Nos. 9 and 35 in the interrogatory which were submitted to him, and the question was put to the witness Schieber under No.20;

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Mr. Speer, No.124, US Exhibit 179 was submitted by the Prosecution. It contains several remarks which you have made during the meetings of the Central Planning Board.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, may I draw your attention to page 53 of the English text of my document book.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Mr. Speer, what do you want to say about your remark concerning idlers in the meeting of 30 October 1942?

A The record reproduces my remark the way I made it. I had an opportunity to read through the shorthand notes of the Central Planning Board, and I discovered that nothing was done after I made this remark. No measures were demanded from me after it.

DR. FLAECHSNER: On the same page, Mr. President, there is a statement from a meeting on 22 April 1943.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Mr. Speer, what do you have to say in connection with that remark regarding Russian prisoners of war?

A It can be elucidated very briefly. This is proof of the fact that the conception of armaments must be understood in the way which I have explained, because the two sectors from which the 90,000 Russians who were employed in armaments, according to this document, were iron, steel and metal industries with 29,000, and machine and boiler construction with 63,000.

Q Mr. Speer, there has also been mention of the statement made by you on 25 May 1944. That, too, can be found on page 53 of the English text of the document book. There you said that, in accordance with instructions from the Fuehrer, the foreign volunteers groups should be dissolved and that there should be a transfer of these Russians.

A Here, again, I read through the shorthand notes, and it can be explained briefly. The HIBIS mentioned in the document are the so-called auxiliary volunteers who had joined the troops fighting in Russia. As the months went by, they had grown to a tremendous number, and during the retreat they followed along since their own countries would probably have treated them as traitors. These volunteers were however not, as was my wish, handed over to the production program, since the conference which was planned did not take place.

Q Will you please say something briefly about PS 556? It is the note from Sauckel about a telephone call on 4 January 1943, which also refers to the labor employment program.

A According to this telephone call, there should be increased measures in France, which would also increase the number of workers. Minutes from the Fuehrer which I found during recent days, namely, those of the meeting of January 3 to 5, 1943, show that at that time Hitler's statement of opinion referred to increased employment of French people in France for the local industry and economy.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, I shall submit this document later because up to now I have not yet had the opportunity to prepare it.

THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell the Tribunal how long youare goint to be, Dr. Flaechsner?

DR. FLAECHSNER: I hope, Mr. President, that I shall be through before five o'clock this afternoon.

THE PRESIDENT: You will not lose sight of what I have said to you already about the relevance of the argument and evidence you have been adducing up to date?

DR. FLAECHSNER: Very well, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.

(A recess was taken until 1400 hours.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Tribunal reconvened at 1400 hours, 20 June 1946)

ALBERT SPEER -- Resumed

DIRECT EXAMINATION -- Continued

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Mr. Speer, this morning we left off with a discussion of your telephone notice regarding the matter of Sauckel and labor commitments, the date of this document being the 4th of January 1943. As you have already stated, the Fuehrer protocol, which I shall submit to the Tribunal later on, is concerned with this matter.

Will you please tell us briefly what the contents of your discussion were at that time?

A In this record it is set down that all measures would have to be taken so that the economy in France would be raised to a higher level. Rather sharp remarks were made by Hitler concerning the methods that he contemplated in this regard. It is stated that every act of sabotage would be prosecuted with the sharpest means and measures, and that humanitarian motives would not be tolerated here.

From this record we also see that at that time I asked Hitler to leave the management of production matters to me, a step which was actually carried out several months later.

I am mentioning this fact -- as long as I am in the witness box, and can speak in my own behalf -- only to show that this plan of Hitler not to regard humanitarian motives was a policy of Hitler's that I did not carry through.

One case came to my attention in which ten hostages were to be shot because they carried on acts of sabotage against industry in the Northern Moselle Sector. At that time I was successful in bringing about the fact that the shooting was not carried through. Roechling, who at that time regulated iron production in the Western regions, is my witness in this case. That is the only case about which I was informed that, because of sabotage in production, hostages were to be shot.

I can prove, furthermore, that in these firms which were producing in France -- through a decision by Hitler dated September 1943 -- I was responsible for furnishing an additional meal to the workers in these plants; I was responsible for the extra food rationing. Then, in a letter addressed to the General Plenipotentiary for Manpower, dated December 1943, I took a decided view and attitude that the workers in the occupied Western countries should not only receive wages, but that besides wages consumer goods should be put at their disposal. This was a policy which is quite contrary to the plundering and pillaging of the Western Regions, an accusation which the French prosecution has made about me.

These three documents are in my possession and they may be submitted; they are available.

I only mention these facts, that the policy as laid down by Hitler in the records of the 3rd to the 5th of January, the policy of acting very harshly in France, was not endorsed by me and was not observed by me.

Q Now I shall turn to another point.

Mr. Speer, what did you have produced in France; that is, on the basis of your program?

A We have already discussed this -- no armament goods; only consumer goods.

Q I just wanted to have you say it again.

In R-124 the prosecution has submitted a Fuehrer protocol dated March 1944, in which you allegedly discussed the proposal by the Reichsmarshal to put prisoners of war at the disposal of the SS. Can you comment on that?

A This record dates back to the 3rd of March, 1944. From January until May of 1944 I was seriously ill, and I did not take part in this discussion; one of my co-workers was in charge of this discussion. He was a man who had the confidence of Hitler. Apart from that, this proposal was not carried through anyway.

Q Mr. Speer, the session of the 30th of May was one that you did attend, on which occasion the question was discussed as to how the establishment of the General Plenipotentiary for Manpower was brought about. Will you tell us briefly just what you know about this question?

A I should like to state this briefly.

I wanted a delegate who would concern himself with all labor problems as they applied to armament production. My concern in the commitment problem, at the beginning of my assuming office, was chiefly concerned with the Gauleiters who carried on a policy of Gau particularism, and the non-political offices of the Work Ministry could not proceed against the Gauleiters. Therefore, recruiting or labor commitment had been frozen in Germany, and I suggested to Hitler that for this delegate a man whom I knew, Gauleiter Hancke, should be chosen. Goering has already confirmed this. Hitler agreed to this proposal of mine.

Two days later, Bormann made the suggestion that Sauckel be chosen, I did not know Sauckel, but I quite agreed to the selection, however. It is quite possible that Sauckel did not anything about this incident, that he can say he did not know anything about it, and that he can say he was chosen on my suggestion.

The position which this office took came about in the following way. Lammers declared that he could not issue authority for a special sector of labor commitment, that there would be misgivings on an administrative basis, and, in that way, the entire commitment problem would have to be subordinated to a plenipotentiary. They contemplated, first of all, a Fuehrer decree. Goering protested, since he thought it was a task which belonged to the Four Year Plan. Therefore, a compromise was reached whereby Sauckel was to be the General Plenipotentiary within the Four Year Plan, but that he would be appointed by Hitler.

This was quite a unique arrangement under the Four Year Plan. In that way, Sauckel was in effect a subordinate of Hitler's, and Sauckel also looked upon it in that way.

Q You have heard that in his testimony, Sauckel, on the 30th of May, said that Goering participated in this meeting of the Central Planning Board. Is that true?

A No, that does not apply at all. It is not true. I would not have known what to do with him, for, after all, we had to carry out practical work.

Q The prosecution has quoted the testimony submitted by Sauckel on the 8th of October, 1945, according to which the arrangement of his delegates was supposed to have been caused by you. Is that true?

A No. In 1941 I had nothing to do with armament, and even later, during the period of Sauckel's activity, I did not employ these delegates and plenipotentiaries. That was a matter which Sauckel handled; it was in his jurisdiction.

Q The French prosecution quoted from the minutes of the testimony of Sauckel on the 27th of September, 1945, and they quoted from this record that you gave a special order to have trains put at the disposal of those responsible for the transporting of workers.

A I believe that I can just summarize the statements made by Sauckel as far as they apply to me and give my answer.

Q Please go ahead.

A The disposition of trains and means of transport were taken by Sauckel and his co-workers. It may be that through a sudden change in the production program or, in effect, on the request of my office, trains were changed. However, the responsibility for that always rested with the General Plenipotentiary for Manpower. Sauckel testified here and said after Stalingrad Goebbels and I started on the "total war" theory. But that is not quite true. Stalingrad took place in January of 1943, and Goebbels started on his program of total war in August of 1944.

After Stalingrad there was supposed to have been a great reform program which was to give us more workers. I was one who endorsed the program. Neither Goebbels now I, however, could carry this plan.

There was a college of three, Lammers, Keitel, and Bormann set up. But this task could not be carried out by these three men, because they lacked the technical background.

Then the labor commitment department was mentioned. This consisted of the following. L arge industry and labor had a manager, and its branches, which were centralized in my office. But this was not something which hurt Sauckel's interest. They had no special sphere of interest. This may be shown from the fact that this was one of the 50 to 60 departments in my office. If it had been very important, it would have been one of my six or eight special branches.

Sauckel further mentioned the fact that the Stabsleiter session which took place in his office was representative of my office, which took place for army and naval armament and for construction work. In these meetings, there were about fifteen people who were responsible for labor commitments, and in these discussions the urgency of supplies and workers was dealt with. Sauckel, of course, had an overall picture of the economic set-up. That was the activity which erroneously is ascribed to the Central Planning Board.

Then, in addition, it was asserted that the transporting of foreign workers to Germany in April of 1942 was done on my initiative, that I had demanded this step, and that I was responsible for the fact that the foreign workers were transported to Germany at all. That, however, is not true. In that way, I reall would not have had to use any influence on Sauckel; and apart from that, from a Fuehrer decree of the 4th of May, 1943, a document which is in my possession, it may be seen that the introduction of compulsory labor in the western region took place at the suggestion of Sauckel, and it was granted by the Fuehrer.

I can further quote a speech which I delivered on the 18th of April, 1942 , which shows that at that period of time I was still of the opinion that the German construction business, which had 1,800,000 workers, was to be inactivated to a large extent so that the necessary labor could be transferred to armament production. In this rather fundamental speech, in which I also talked about labor commitments, a speech which I held before my co-workers, not word is said about the planning of a foreign labor draft.

If I had been the one who had actively pursued these plans, then naturally I should have mentioned this fact in this speech of mine.

Finally, as far as Sauckel's testimony is concerned, the plan of the organization which was submitted here was not correct insofar as the various sectors which were mentioned as being divided into ministries were concerned. In reality these sectors were distributed according to the various economic branches, quite independent of the ministry. They coincided with my sphere of work only in my ministry and in the Air Ministry.

It is further incorrect when it is said that in the Ministry of Economy, construction was represented. That industry belonged in my jurisdiction; and beginning with 1943 , chemistry and mining, both of which are mentioned in the Ministry of Economy, belonged in my sphere of jurisdiction. According to my knowledge, already, prior to September of 1943 , these branches were represented through plenipotentiaries in the Four Year Plan, and, quite independent of the Ministry of Economy, had put their demands to Sauckel direct.

In this plan, it is incorrect further that the demands for these workers went directly to Hitler. It would have been quite impossible for Hitler to have this quarrel between 15 men settled. As I have already said, this matter was dealt with in the Stabsleiter conferences.

Q Mr. Speer, at the end of the war, what did you do with your documents?

A In my opinion, I was obligated to save my documents so

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that during reconversion the necessary measures could be taken. I refused to have the matters looked up. Nurnberg was one of my branch archives. They were well kept here, and they were turned over to the Allies in good condition. I turned them over at the time when I was still at liberty in the Flensburg Zone. In this way, the prosecution is in posession of various documents, about a thousand of them: three Stabsleiter speeches, all public speeches, speeches which applied to armament; about 4,000 Fuehrer decrees, 5,000 pages of stenographic records of the Central Planning Board, memoranda, and so forth.

I am just mentioning these facts, for from these documents it can be seen unambiguously how far and how largely my task was an economic one and a technical one.

Q In those documents, according to your recollection, did you ever make statements of an ideological nature such as anti-Semitism, or other problems?

A No; nor in memoranda did I ever say anything like that. I assumed that otherwise the prosecution would have been in a position to present these matters to me.

Q Mr. Speer, as armament minister, you were also mentioned on the list of the new government which the men carrying out the Putsch had set up after the 2 0th of July. Did you participate in the attempted assassination of the 20th of July?

A No. Neither did I participate, nor had I been advised of this matter in advance. At that time I disapproved of an assassination attempt upon H itler.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, at this point, there are interrogatories of the witness Kemp f in Point 9 and the witness Stahl in Point 1 that concern themselves with this matter.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q What was the reason why you were the only minister in the National Socialist regime placed on the list of the opposition?

A At that time, I had a close collaboration with the men who were of the General Staff of the army and the commander-in-chief of the Home Guard. Both staffs were the nucleus for the attempted assassination on the 20th of July.

My relation with Generaloberst Fromm, who was the leader of the Home Guard, was particularly close, and also with Generaloberst Zeitzler, the chief of the General Staff of the army. After the 20th of July, Fromm was hanged, and Zietzler was dismissed from the army.

From this collaboration a very close contact arose. Those circles knew of my technical achievements. At that time, I assumed that those were the technical reasons why they wanted to retain me.

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Q Did political reasons play any part of that connection of yours?

A Not directly, certainly not. Of course, I was well known for the fact that for quite sometime I had disapproved the excesses which took place in the vicinity of Hitler and as I later found out, that I was in many ways in one opinion with the men of the 20th of July.

Q What was your working connection with Hitler?

A From 1937 until September of 1939, as an architect, my capacity as an architect was the closest phase of connection; then, because of war circumstances, this relationship decreased -- after I was appointed to be the successor of Todt, a closer but much more official working relationship was established rather. Because I had large demands in industry, I had very little time to go to headquarters because my time was taken up with armament matters; perhaps once in two or three weeks I was at the Fuehrer's headquarters The fact of my illness, which lasted for four months in the spring of 1944, was utilized and exploited by many people to weaken my position and after the 20th of July, the fact that I was a minister or that I was a nominee for the ministry, brought about a shock to the ministers on the part of Bormann and Goebbels and this fact was used for an open fight and the details for this may be seen from a letter which on the 20th of December 1944 was sent to Hitler and which has been submitted as a document.

Q Could you carry on political discussions with Hitler?

A No, he considered me purely a technical minister. Attempts to discuss political or personal problems with him were always fruitless and they were fruitless because of the fact that he was unapproachable. Beginning with 1944, as far as general conversations were concerned and conversations dealing with the general war situation, he was so adverse that I set them down myself in writing and handed them to him. Hitler was able to deal with every man as far as his own speciality was concerned. He was the only coordinating factor. This was something which exceeded his power and his knowledge; the consequence was the lack of the unified political leadership and there was the lack of a technical military decisive post.

Q Then, as an expert minister, do you wish to almost limit your responsibility as to your sphere of work?

A No, I should like to say something of fundamental importance here.

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This war brought quite inconceivable catasrophe to the German people and it started a world catastrophe. Therefore, it is my duty, of course, to assume my place of responsibility before the German people. This duty and obligation was mine--this is all the more my responsibility since the head of the government did not claim responsibility before the world. I, as an important member of the management of the leadership of the people, of the Reich, therefore will willingly assume my share of the responsibility, beginning with 1942, my arguments will be mentioned.

Q Would youassume responsibility of your extensive sphere of influence?

A That is a matter of course, as far as it is poss ible, according to the principles which apply and was dealt with according to my directive.

Q Do you wish to refer to Fuehrer decrees in this connection?

A No. In so far as Hitler gave me the decrees and orders and I carried them through. I assumed the responsibility for them. Of course, I did not carry through all the orders which he gave me.

DR. FI SCHNER: Mr. President, now I am turning to a second part in my examination in chief. This presentation is not meant to exonerate the defendant from those accusations which apply to his actual sphere of activity. This part, on the other hand, concerns itself with those accusations which the prosecution has raised against the defendant as a member of the so-called joint conspiracy. This second chapter is relatively brief and I assume that I shall be able to conclude this matter and conclude my entire examination in-chief within an hour.

In this matter, we are concerned with Speer's activity as to the prevention of the destruction intentions on the part of Hitler in Germany and of the Occupied Countries and of the measures and attempts which had the intention to shorten the war which he assumed was already lost and I assume that the High Tribunal will quite agree to my presentation.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Mr. Speer, up until what point did you use your entire strength and power for an armament program and for the continuation of the war?

A Up until the middle of January 1945.

Q Hadn't the war been lost before that?

A Militarily, and according to the general situation, it had been lost prior to that time; however, it is difficult to consider a war as lost and to draw the last personal consequences if only an unconditional surrender is the thing thatn you are faced with.

Q Wasn't there a consideration for the production situation--didn't that situation which you had to consider, didn't it force you to consider the war as lost long before this?

A From the point of view of armament, not up until the Fall of 1944, for I succeeded up until that time, despite bombing attacks, to bring about a constant rising production schedule. Just to mention one figure, in the year 1944, one hundred infantry divisions and forty armored divisions could be requipped by me completely and that was the new equipment for two million men. If it had been thirty percent higher--it would have been thirty percent higher if we had not had the bombing attacks. Our top achievements during the entire war took place in August of 1944, as far as munitions are concerned--in September 1944 for airplanes and in December of 1944 for ordnance and the new U-boats; we reached our top production in those months, The new weapons, perhaps beginning with February, March of 1945, would have been put into use. I should like to refer to the jet planes, the new U-boats, and the new anti-aircraft installations and so forth. Of course, because of the bombing attacks, the mass production of these new weapons was retarded and perhaps in the last phases they might have changed the situation, Towards the end, we did not have sufficient numbers at our disposal. All of these attempts of ours were fruitless, since beginning with the 12th of May 1944, our aviation gasoline plants were heavily attacked from the air by the enemy and we had heavy losses after that time. With the sucess of these attacks the war had been lost on the basis of technical considerations. The new weapons without gas were of no use to me at all.

Q Did you tell Hitler about the results and consequences of the bombing attacks and their effect on production; did you tell Hitler?

A Yes, I told him about this in detail, in writing, and orally. From June until December 1944, I sent twelve memoranda and all of them reported castastrophic news.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, in this connection, I should like to submit the report which deals with a memorandum which speer sent in June of 1944. It is reproduced on page 56 of the document book and it shall be exhibit 14. I should like to quote from this. Speer says and writes to Hitler; "But then perforce in September of this year the flow of the quantities necessary to cover the most urgent needs of the Wehrmacht cannot be guaranteed any more. which means that from that time on there will be an insurmountable gap which of course must lead to tragic consequences."

About the situation which applied to chemistry and the production of gaselene, Speer informed Hitler in another memoranda, dated 30th of August, '44. This may be found on Page 62 of the English text, and this will be Exhibit No. 15. I should like to quote but one sentence: "And in this way, in important phases, those materials which are necessary for the products of maodern war are lacking."

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Mr. Speer, how was it possible that you and the other co-workers of Hitler, despite your realization of the situation, still tried to do everything possible to continue the war?

A In this phase of the war Hitler deceived all of us. Through his man, Hewel, of the Foreign Office, beginning with summer of 1944, he had precise reports disseminated and he led us to believe that foreign political discussions had been started. This can be confirmed by Colonel General Jodl. In this way, the repeated presence of the Japanese ambassador with Hitler was interpreted in such a way that through Moscow we were carrying on conversations with Moscow, or the envoy, Neubacher, who has been here as a witness, allegedly in the Balkans, had initiated conversations with the united States, or the former Soviet Minister in Berlin allegedly was present in Stockholm in order to initiate and introduce conversations. In this way he spread the hope that, like Japan in this rather hopeless situation, conversations would be started so that the people would be saved from the very latest and worst and in this way it would be possible to stiffen resistance and make it as strong as possible. He deceived all of us inasmuch as he gave the military leaders false hopes in the way of diplomatic steps, and he promised the political leaders new victories through the use of new weapons and led them to believe that this could be expected. He told the people and the combat troops and systematically had the rumor spread of a new miracle weapon, so that resistance would be maintained. I can prove, in the speech which I made at this time and in letters, that Hitler and Goebels were carrying through the policy of lying to the people and promising them a miracle weapon.

Q Mr. Speer, were there decrees for destruction of the industries in Belgium Holland and France?

A Yes. In case of an occupation by the Allies, Hitler had planned a farreaching system of destruction of industries essential to war in all of these countries. According to planned preparations, industries, mines and other installations were to have been destroyed.

Q Did you undertake to do anything to prevent the carrying through of these orders?

A Yes.

Q And did you prevent them?

A For the carrying through of this decree the Commander in Chief of the West was responsible, since this decree was to be carried out in his operation zone. But I learned of it and told him that this destruction, as far as I was concerned, had no sense and no purpose, and that I, in my capacity as Armament Minister, did not consider this destruction essential. That is why the order to destroy was not given and therefore I had taken that responsibility against Hitler, that this destruction did not take place.

Q When was that?

A The beginning of July, 1944.

Q How could you justify your position?

A All the military leaders whom I knew said at that time that the war would have to end in October or November, after the invasion had been a succes s. I personally had the same opinion, especially as it applied to gasoline. This may be seen from my memoranda which I sent to Hitler on the 30th of August, a document in which I told him that in view of this development with regard to gasolene, no operational actions on the part of the troops would be possible by October or November. The fact that the war did last longer than that may be traceable to a bogging down of the offensive on the part of the enemy in the fall of '44, In that way our need for gasolene could be met and the west front could be re-equipped with new weapons. In this situation I could answer for the fact that industries in the western countries would be left to the enemy undamaged, for at the outside, they could be of use to them after nine months. This ste coincides with the protection of the unemployed workers in the blocked industrie a matter which I dealt with this morning.

Q Did Hitler agree with these measures?

A He could not agree with these measures for he did not know anything abou them. It was rather an exciting period of time in headquarters and he did not think of the fact that he should check on these measures dealing with destructio Later, in January of 1945, the Frenchmen reported in their press about the reconstruction of their undestroyed industries. Then, of course, I had many and heavy accusations leveled against me.

Q The French prosecution has submitted a document, RF 132. This is a repor of the Field Economic Office dealing with the Netherlands According to this report, in September of 1944 there still existed the decree of the Commander in Chief of the West that only in the coastel town destruction was to take place but nowhere else, and the officer who was competent for the Netherlands sets down, as may be seen from the document, that the order of the Commander in Chief of the West was obsolete and that he had decreed on his own initiative that the industries should be destroyed in Holland. How was this possible and what did you do at that time?

A Because of the over-enthusuasm of some of the lower levels, the basis decrees not to destroy in the western region were crushed and our instruments for carrying through orders had been destroyed through bombing attacks. Seyss-Inquart had told me of the fact that destruction was to take place in Holland, and he has already testified that I authorized him that this was not to take place. This was in December of 1944. So that this destruction could be prevented on the 5th of September, 1944, on my own initiative, I told the managers of the coal and iron production and the chief of the civilian administration in Luxemmbourg that destruction in the monet mines and Saar mines of Belgium and Holland and so forth, was to be prevented. At that time, in the face of the hopeless war situation, we went so far that the man who was responsible for electric current furnished current to the other side so that the pumping stations in the mines would not have to stop, because a stopping of these pumping stations would have caused a flooding of the mines.

DR. FLAECHSNER: In this connection, I should like to submit a copy of a letter from Speer to the Gauleiter Simon at Koblenz. This is Speer Exhibit No. 16 It will be found on Page 57 of the English text in my document book.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Mr. Speer, as far as the other occupied countries were concerned, that is outside of France, Belgium and Holland, did you use your influence to prevent destruction?

A Beginning with August of 1944, concerning the industrial installations in the Government General, the ore works in the Balkans, the nickle works in Finland; beginning with September, 1944, the industrial installations in Upper Silesia; beginning with February, 1945, the oil fields in Hungary and the industries of Czechoslovakia. I should like to emphasize in this connection that, to a great extent, I had the support of Colonel General Jodl, who quietly tolerated this policy of non-destruction.

Q What intention for the maintenance of industry and the mode of life for the German population did Hitler have at the beginning of September, 1944, when hostile troops approached the boundaries of the Greater German Reich?

A He had no intention at all to save industry. On the cotrary, he ordered especially as applying to Germany, the policy of the scorched earth, a nd that meant the ruthless destruction of all installations at the approach of the enemy. Behind this policy were Bormann, Ley and Goebbels, whereas the various branches of the Wehrmacht and the expert ministries opposed this policy of his.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Since there were efforts on the part of Speer to prevent these intentions to destroy, measures which had been intensified in those areas which were considered part of the German Reich, such as Upper Silesia, Austria Poland, the Protectorates of Bohemia and Moravia, I should like to have this topic admitted as part of my evidence.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Mr. Speer, in the greater German Reich, in the areas that I have just delineated, did the Commanders in Chief of the Army have instructions for carrying out works of destruction?

A No. The executive powers for that, so far as industries were concerned, rested with me. As far as bridges and docks were concerned, the responsibility rested with the Wehrmacht.

Q. In your measures for the protection of industry, did you differentiate between the areas of the so-called old Reich and the territories which were added after 1933?

A. No. The Polish and Upper Silesian industrial region, Austria, Bohemia and Moravia were protected against destruction in the same way as the German areas, and especially in the eastern territories. Through personal visits I took the necessary steps right then and there in the localities involved.

Q. What did you undertake against the scorched earth policy?

A. On the 14th of September 1944, I returned, having taken a trip to the West front, and on that day I found the decree that everything was to be destroyed ruthlessly. I immediately issued a counter-decree which officially prescribed the protection of industrial installations.

At that time, I was quite excited about the fact that now industries were to be destroyed in Germany, especially since the war situation was hopeless, and I was all the more excited because I believed that I had succeeded in saving the industries in the occupied western countries from destruction.

DR. FLAECHSNER: In this connection, I should like to submit a document which is a decree by Speer dated the 14th of September 1944, for it deals with the protection of industries. It may be found on page 48 of the English text of my document book. This will be Exhibit No. 17.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q. Mr. Speer, could you carry through this order?

THE PRESIDENT: What is the date of it? The 14th of September, did you say?

DR. FLAECHSNER: The 14th of September, Mr. President, 1944.

THE PRESIDENT: What page is it?

DR. FLAECHSNER: It is page 58 of the English text.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q. Could you carry through this order of yours, Mr. Speer?

A. At the same time, in the newspaper Der Voelkischer Beobachter, through an official article by the Reich Press Chief, the scorched earth policy was publicly proclaimed, so it was quite clear to me that my counter-decree could not have any effect for any length of time.

This might be considered a typical method, which was quite customary in Hitler's circle. In order to dissuade him from the scorched earth policy, I used the tool of the faith which the people had that the territories which had been lost would be recaptured. I told him that if these industrial areas would be lost, a third of my potential would be lost; therefore we would have to recapture them, and if they were recaptured they would be of value only if they were intact and not destroyed by us.

Q. Therefore you addressed a letter to Bormann.

DR. FLAECHSNER: I should like to submit this letter as Exhibit No. 18, Mr. President. It will be found on page 59 of the English text of my document book.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q. Did you send this teletype message to Bormann before you discussed the contents with Hitler?

A. Yes. I should like to summarize --

THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) Would you give the French page as well so that the French members may have it.

DR. FLAECHSNER: It is page 56 of the French text of the document book.

A. (Continuing): Hitler approved of the text which I submitted to him, and I suggested the alternatives, either to consider the war as lost, or to have the areas remain intact. The destruction of the Monet mines was demanded with much emphasis by Hitler, but in this case I was successful, as may be seen from the document, in preventing the destruction of these mines through the fact that I turned Hitler's hopes to victory.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, the document to which the defendant just referred is an extract from the Fuehrer decree of the 18th of August 1944 and I should like to submit it as Speer Exhibit No. 19. It is reproduced in the supplementary volume of my document book on page 101.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q. Mr. Speer, how did this originate?

A. I have already told you about that.

Q. In your letters we repeatedly find the concept of paralyzing, lachmen, and this concept is mentioned in connection with industrial installations. Will you tell the Tribunal just what you mean by this term "paralyzing".

A. I can say but briefly that we were concerned with the taking out of some special parts by which the works might be put out of commission temporarily, but these parts were not destroyed; they were just concealed.

Q. Just a little while ago you emphasized that up until January 1945 you tried to bring about armament to the highest possible degree. What were your reasons for the fact that after January 1945 you gave up these ideas?

A. From January of 1945 onward, a very unpleasant chapter began. We were entering the last phase of this war, and to realize that Hitler was identifying the fate of the German people with his own, and beginning with March of 1945 there was the realiaation that Hitler was deliberately trying to destroy the means of life for the people in view of the fact that the war was lost.

It is not my intention to say anything which might help me in my case, but this is a matter of honor which I have to defend, and that is the reason why I should like to tell you briefly about this period of time.

Q. Mr. Speer, what was the production situation in the various areas which were under your jurisdiction at the end of January 1945?

A. The fuel production, since the beginning of the attacks on the fuel plants in May 1944, was quite inadequate and the situation did not recover or improve. The bombing attacks on our transportation centers, beginning with November 1944, had eliminated the Ruhr area as a center of German raw material and with the successful offensive of the Soviet armies on thecoal areas of Upper Silesia, beginning with the middle of January 1945 the largest supply of coal was cut off from that region.

In that way we could figure quite accurately when the economic set-up would have to collapse, and at that point the situation would have been reached at which even if there were a complete cessation of operations on the part of the enemy, the war would be lost in a short time, for the Reich, because of its deficiency of coal and other things, would have to collapse economically of its own accord.

DR. FLAECHSNER: In this connection, I should like to quote a memorandum which Hitler received from Speer on the 11th of December 1944. Mr. President, you will find an extract on page 64 of the English text and page 61 of the German and French texts. It states -- and I quote:

"According to the whole structure of the Reich economy it is obvious that a failure of the territory of the Rheinish Westphalian industry in the long run will be unbearable for the whole German economy and the successful continuation of the war. In fact, at present, the Ruhr territory, with the exception of the products manufactured within the sector, is a total loss for the German economy.

"It is not necessary to discuss the consequences for the whole German Reich which will result from a long deprivation of the Ruhr territory."

On the 15th of December 1944, because of the imminent Ardennes offensive, Hitler pointed out in detail the consequences of the possible loss of Upper Silesia, and in this connection I should like to submit a memorandum written by Speer which may be found on page 102 of the supplementary volume of my document book in the English text, and at page 101 in the French text. This is an extract from a memorandum addressed to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, dated the 15th of December 1944, and will have exhibit number 21. This memorandum was addressed to Hitler as well.

I shall not need to quote from this extract. It is proved here that the possible loss of Upper Silesia would make fighting impossible even after a few months. A large part of Upper Silesia was lost in actuality shortly thereafter.

On the 30th of January 1945, Speer again sent a memorandum to Hitler, which will be found on page 67 of the English text of the document book. It is page 64 in the French text. This document will be Exhibit No. 22, and I should like to quote from it:

"After the loss of Upper Silesia, German armament will not be in a position to cover even partially the requirements of the front in munitions, weapons and tanks, the losses on the front and the need for replacements."

Then there follows, as special emphasis, the sentence -- and I quote: "The material superiority of the enemy can therefore no longer be compensated, even by the bravery of our soldiers."

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q. Mr. Speer, what did you mean to say by this last sentence which I quoted?

A. At that time Hitler issued the slogan that in the defense of the home country, the bravery of the soldiers would be increased tremendously, and that vice versa, the allied troops, after the liberation of the occupied territories, would have a lessened will to fight. That was the chief argument used by Goebbels and Bormann as well, since they wanted to intensify war at all costs and by all means.

Q. Mr. Speer, was Hitler advised from other sources as well as by yourself?

A. I shall summarize several points in this connection. Guderian, who was the Chief of Staff of the Army, reported to Ribbentrop to tell him that the war was lost. Ribbentrop reported this to Hitler, and Hitler then told Guderian and myself at the beginning of February that the making of statements of that sort, that is, by memorandum or anything like that, would be considered as high treason and would be punished accordingly. Later, in a situation report, he prohibited any close collaborators from making any statements about the complete hopelessness of the situation. Anyone who violated that, without regard for his position or rank, would be shot and his family would be arrested.

The statements and opinions which Guderian and I told Hitler about the hopelessmess of the war situation had an unexpected result. In fact, nothing was expected because in the first days of February, just a few days before the beginning of the Yalta Conference, Hitler had his press expert come to his office and in my presence told him to say, in the most drastic manner through the German press, "Never capitulate". At that time he declared that he was doing this so that in no event would the German people receive any offer from the enemy, and the language used would have to be so strong that the enemy statesmen would not even want to try to separate the people.

At the same time he proclaimed again to the German people and he used the slogan "Victory or Collapse" and all of this took place at a period of time when it would have had to be clear to him and any intelligent man who was around him that the only thing possible was collapse.

At a meeting of Gauleiters, which took place in the summer of 1944, Hitler at that time already stated, and Schirach is my witness to this, that if the German people had to be vanquished in the struggle then the German people had been too weak, that it could not meet the examination of history and that it was meant for nothing but collapse. Now in this hopeless situation which existed in January and February of 1945 Hitler made remarks which showed that the statements which he had made at that time had not been pure oratory and rhetoric. In this period of time he saw in an increasing degree the guilt and failure of the German people in the conduct of the war but he never placed any blame upon himself. He used pretty strong language when talking about the failure of the German people, a people who made so many brave sacrifices in this war.

Q Colonel General Jodl has already testified before this Court that Hitler and his co-workers as well saw the hopelessness of the military and economic situation; that they were quite clear about the situation. In this hopeless picture was not there a joint step taken by some of the advisors of Hitler so that he could be asked to terminate the war?

A No. A joint step of the leading men surrounding Hitler did not take place. A step like this was quite impossible for these men considered themselves either people who were to receive orders or they were experts and they had resigned themselves to the situation. In this situation no one undertook to take the leadership to bring about just a discussion for the prevention of further sacrifices. No one approached Hitler on that.

On the other side there was quite an influential group which, with all means at their disposal, tried to intensify the struggle.

That was Goebbels, Bormann and Ley and as we have said Fegelein and Burgdorf. This group was responsible for the fact that Hitler should be persuaded to leave the Geneva Convention. Dr. Goebbels, beginning in February, gave Hitler a rather sharp memorandum in which he demanded our withdrawal from the Geneva Convention. Hitle had already endorsed this proposal or intention, as the state secretary of Goebbels told me. With this step the struggle was to be carried on without consideration for any international agreement and was to be carried through at all costs. This was the sense of the memorandum addressed by Goebbels to Hitler. He mentioned that this intention of Hitler and Goebbels failed because of the resistance of the military leaders. The state secretary to Goebbels, Naumann, told me this later on.

Q Mr. Speer, the witness Stahl, in his written testimony, said that in about the middle of February 1945 you had demanded a supply of new poinsonous gas in order to carry out the assassination of Bormann, Goebbels and Hitler. Why did you have this intention?

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A In my opinion there was no other way out. In my despair I wanted to undertake this step as beginning with February it was quite obvious to me that Hitler wanted to continue the war at all costs, ruthlessly, without consideration for the German people. It was quite clear to me that in the losing of the war he confused his own fate with that of the German people and that in his own mind he saw the end of the German people as well. It was clear that the war was lost so completely that unconditional surrender would have to be accepted.

Q Did you wish to carry through this assassination yourself and why was it a failure ?

A I did not wish to testify as to the particulars. I could have carried it through personally only since from the 20th of July only a closer circle had access to Hitler. I had met with various technical difficulties.

THE PRESIDENT : The Tribunal would like to hear the details but will hear them after the adjournment.

(A recess was taken.)

BY DR. FLAECHSNER :

Q Mr. Speer, will you tell the Tribunal what the difficulties were against your carrying out your intentions ?

A I am most unwilling to describe the details because there is something unsympathetic about such matters but it is only because it is the wish of the Tribunal that I shall do so.

Hitler, during those days often had conversations in his military shelter about the military situation with Ley, Goebbels and Bormann, who were particularly close to him in those days because they supported his military plans and cooperated.

After the 20th of July it was no longer possible for event the closest associates of Hitler to enter into that shelter of his without their brief-cases being examined by the SS for high explosives. As an architect I knew this shelter intimately. It had an air-conditioning plant similar to the one which has been fitted into this Courtroom.

It was not particularly difficult to get at the fresh air in-take of this plant, which was in the garden of the Reichschancellory, and to insert gas into it. By means of this plant, the gas would then be distributed through the entire shelter in a very brief period.

Thereupon, in the middle of February 1945, I went to the head of my department for munitions, and I had him come to me. Since I had worked closely with him during construction cases, I discussed with him openly my opinion and my intention, as the testimony shows. I asked that, being the man who was manufacturing munitions, I be supplied with modern poison gas. He inquired of one of his associates how one might get this poison gas, and in this connection it turned out that this new poison gas would only be effective if it was made to explode, since then the high temperature was reached which was necessary for gassing.

I am not sure whether I am going too much into detail, but an explosion was not possible, as this air conditioning plant was made of thin tin, just as it is here in this room, and since the explosion would have torn that tin to pieces.

Consequently, I had conferences with the chief engineer of the Chancellory, Herr Henschel. This was in the middle of March 1945. By means of many discussions, I arranged that the anti-gas filter was not continuously switched on, by means of which I would have been able to use an ordinary type of gas.

Naturally, Henschel had no knowledge of the purpose for which I was conducting the talks with him. When the time came, I inspected the air in-take in the garden of the Chancellory, together with Henschel, and there I found out that shortly before that, by personal order from Hitler, this in-take had been surrounded by a chimney which was four meters high. That can still be ascertained on the spot. Through this, the carrying out of my plan was no longer possible.

Q I shall now come to another problem. Mr. Speer, we have had the witnesses Riecke and Milch in this Courtroom, and they have stated what they knew about your activities after the

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middle of February 1945, which you carried out in order to secure the food position. What do you yourself have to say to this in regard to your work in that direction?

A I can say very briefly that the preferential food supplies-which I put into effect at the time myself were arranged for the purpose of going from a war situation to a peace situation. This was at the expense of the armament, which I personally represented.

The tremendous number of measures which we introduced would be too extensive to describe here. All of these decrees are still available. The point was that, contrary to the official policy, we wanted to arrange that shortly before their occupation large towns should be sufficiently supplied with food, and that, considering the catastrophe in transportation, every step should be taken that the crop in 1945 should be transported in good time, and that the seeds should be transported in good time, which was a burning problem at that time. Had the seeds arrived a few weeks too late, then the crops would have been extremely bad.

These measures had, of course, a direct, disadvantageous e effect on armament production, which can not be measured, but at any rate, armaments could maintain production through its reserve only until the middle of March, after which there was no armament production worth mentioning. This is owing to the fact that we only had 20 to 30 per cent of the traffic volume at our disposal, and my unconditional preference for food transport over armament transport did, therefore, exclude in practice all armament transport.

Q Was it possible that such measures, which were openly against the official war slogan--"Resistance to the Last"--were broadly carried out? Were there people who were prepared to carry out such measures as you were suggesting, and to carry them into practice?

A These measures were not so difficult and they were not so dangerous as one might perhaps describe them, because in those days--after January 1945--any reasonable measure could be carried out in Germany against the official policy. Any reasonable man would be in favor of reasonable measures and would be satisfied if anyone would assume responsibility for them. All of these conferences took place amongst a large circle of experts. Everyone of these participants knew, without its ever being said, what the meaning of those orders was. During those days I had close contacts with reference to various other measures with the Secretary of State of the Traffic Ministry, the Ministry of Food, the Ministry of Propaganda, and later, even with the State Secretary of the Party Chancellory; that is, Bormann, the State Secretary, himself, and they were all old Party members. In spite of that, they did their duty to the nation at that time differently from the way in which many leading men in the Party were doing it. I kept them currently informed, in spite of Hitler's prohibition, of the developments in the military field, and in that manner there was much that we could do jointly to stop the insane orders of those days.

Q In which sectors did you see a danger for the further existence of the German people through the unnecessary continuation of the war?

A In the middle of March 1945, the enemy troops were once more on the move. It was absolutely clear by then that quite soon those territories which had not yet been occupied would be occupied, including the territories of Polish Upper Silesia belonging outside the borders of the old Reich. The ordered destruction of all bridges during retreat was actually the greatest danger because a bridge blown up by engineers is much more difficult to repair than a bridge which has been destroyed by an air attack. A planned destruction of bridges amounts to the destruction of the spirit of life in a modern state.

In addition, beginning with the end of January, radical circles in the Party were making demands for the destruction of industry, and it was also Hitler's opinion that this should be so. In February, 1945, therefore, I stopped production and supply of the so-called industrial dynamiting materials. The intention was that the stocks of explosives in the mines and private professions should be diminished. As a witness of mine will say, these orders were actually carried out.

In the middle of March, Guderian and I tried once more to stop the ordered destruction of bridges or to reduce it to a minimom.

An order was put before Hitler which he refused bluntly, and he demanded to the contrary, that there should be increased orders for the destruction of bridges. Simultaneously, on the 18th of March 1945, he had eight officers shot because they had failed to do their duty in connection with the destruction of a bridge. He mentioned this fact in the Armed Forces Bulletin so that there would be a warning for future cases. By this means it was extremel difficult to disobey orders for the destruction of bridges.

In spite of this existing prohibition, I sent a new memorandum to Hitler on the 18th of March, 1945, the contents of which were most clear and in which I did not allow him any further excuses for the measures he had planned. The memorandum was brought to the knowledge of numerous of his associates.

DR. FLAECHSNER: The Tribunal will find extracts from that memorandum on page 69 of the English text of the document book.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Will you continue, please?

A I shall quote something from that memorandum on page 69, Mr. President:

"The enemy air force has concentrated further on traffic installations. Economic transportation has thereby been considerably reduced.

"In four to eight weeks the final collapse of Germany must therefore be expected for certain. In four to eight weeks, after that collapse, the war cannot even be continued militarily.

"We at the head have the duty that the nation should be helped in these serious hours, which must be expected.

"In this connection, we must soberly, and without regard for our fate, ask ourselves the question as to how this can be done even in the more remote future.

"If the opponent wishes to destroy the nation and its basis of life, then he must do the job himself. We must do everything to maintain, even if perhaps in a most primitive manner, a basis of life for the nation to the last."

Then there follow a few of my remarks, and I shall summarize them. I quote:

"It must be guaranteed that if the battle advances further into the territory of the Reich nobody has the right to destroy industrial plants, coal mines, electric plants, and other supply facilities, as well as traffic facilities, internal shipping routes etc.

"The blowing up of bridges to the extent which has been planned would mean that traffic facilities would be more thoroughly destroyed than the air attacks of the last weeks have been able to achieve. Their destruction, in the end, means the removal of any further possibility for existence of the German Nation."

Then, I shall quote briefly from the end of the memorandum:

"We have no right, at this stage of the war, to carry out destructions on our part which might affect the life of the Nation.

"If the enemies wish to destroy this Nation, which has fought with a unique bravery, then this historical shame shall rest exclusively upon them.

"We have the obligation of leaving to the Nation all possibilities which, in the more remote future, might be able to insure for it a new reconstruction."

With this there was expressed clearly enough something which Hitler would have to know in any case, because there was not the need for much economic understanding to realize the results of such destruction for the future of the Nation.

On the occasion of the handing over of the memorandum -- the knowledge of which he already had since I had discussed it with some of his associates --Hitler made statements which are typical of the attitude which he had towards this principal question.

The severe accusations which I made, by saying that he wanted to draw Germany into an abyss, is something I would not have raised here if there had not been the letter of 29 May 1945, which confirmed the statements of view in that respect.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that the 29th of May or March?

THE WITNESS: March, Mr. President.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, you will find this document on page 72 of the English text in my document book, and it is page 75 in the French text. I submit it as Exhibit No. 24. It is Speer's letter to Hitler, dated the 29th of March, 1945.

BY DR. FAECHSNER:

Q Will you continue, please?

THE PRESIDENT: Ought you not to read the letter?

DR. FLAECHSNER: I was going to suggest it. I think the defendant wants to read it.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Will you read it?

A I quote:

"When on 18 March I transmitted my letter to you I was of the firm conviction that the conclusions which I had drawn from the present situation for the maintenance of our national power would find your unconditional approval, because you yourself had once determined that it was the task of the government to preserve a nation from a heroic end if the war should be lost.

"However, during the evening you made declarations to me, the tenor of which, unless I misunderstood you, was clearly as follows: If the war is to be lost the nation will also perish. This fate is inevitable. There was no necessity to take into consideration the basis which the people would need to continue a most primitive existence. On the contrary, it would be wiser to destroy even these things ourselves, becuase this nation had proved to be the weaker one and the future belonged solely to the stronger Eastern Nation. Besides, those who remain after the battle are only the inferior ones; for the good ones have fallen."

I go on to quote:

"After these words I was profoundly shaken, and when on the next day I read the order for destruction, and shortly after that the strict order of evacuation, I saw in this the first steps toward the realization of these intentions."

DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, may I refer in this connection to a document of Speer which is the destruction order of Hitler, dated the 19th of March 1945, which the Tribunal will find on page 73 of the French and page 76 of the English text of my document book.

I also submit to the Tribunal the order for the traffic and communication systems which you will find on page 78 of the English text and page 75 of the French text. They become Speer Exhibit No. 26.

Then there is the order for destruction and evacuation by Bormann dated 23 March, 1945, which is contained in the supplemantary volume of my document book, where it appears on page 102. The latter exhibit will have the number 27.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Mr. Speer, since these are orders with technical expressions, will you please summarize the contents briefly for the Tribunal?

THE PRESIDENT: You said that last one was at page 102 of the second volume. In my copy that is a document of General Guderian of December 15, 1944.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, I beg to apologize, I have made a mistake. It isn't page 102, it is page 93. I beg to apologize; it is at pages 93 and 94. I have only just received the document book today.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Mr. Speer, will you briefly elucidate these orders?

A I can summarize them very briefly. They gave the order to the Gauleiters to carry out the destruction of all industrial plants, public facilities, water works, gas works, and so on and so forth, and also the destruction of all food stores and clothing stores. My jurisdiction had specifically been excluded, by means of that order, and the right to give instructions to industry, which I had, had been cancelled.

The military sources had given the order that there should be

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The military sources had given the order that there should be destruction of all bridges, and over and above that, all railway installations, communications systems, the Reichsbahn, the German railway, and also the waterways, of all ships, of all railway transportation, and of all locomotives.

The target was, as is stated in one of the decrees, the creation of a traffic desert.

The Bormann decree meant to bring the population to the center of the Reich, both from the West and the East, and the foreign workers and prisoners of war were to be added to it.

These millions of people were to be sent upon their trek on foot. No provisions for their existence had been made or could be carried out, considering the situation.

The carrying out of these orders alone would have had an unimaginable hunger catastrophe as its result. Add to this that on the 19th of March, 1945, there was a strict order from Hitler to all army groups and all Gauleiters, saying that the fight should be conducted without consideration for our own population.

With the carrying out of these orders, his pledge of the 18th would be broken, saying that it would not be necessary that the basic live principles for the leadership should have been saved, but it would be better to destroy these things. Considering the discipline which came into force in Germany in connection with every order, no matter what its contents were, it was to be expected that these orders would be carried out.

These orders also applied to those territories which had been included in the Greater German Reich.

Now, I quite openly, during journeys into the most endangered territories, and by means of discussions with my associates, tried to stop the carrying out of the orders, and I ordered that the high explosives which were still available in the Ruhr should be dropped down the mines, and that the stores of high explosives which were on the building site should be hidden. We issued machine pistols to the most important plants so that they could fight against destruction. All this, I know, sounds somewhat exaggerated, but the atmosphere of the time was such that if a Gauleiter had dared to approach the coal mines in the Ruhr and there was one machine pistol on the spot, then they would have fired.

I tried to convince the local army commanders of the non-sensical character of the task which had been given to them, and furthermore, by talking to the local authorities, I succeeded in stopping most of the evacuatio which had been ordered. Once again the secretary of the Party Chancellery, Klopper, earned my recognition by holding up the evacuation orders which were to be sent to the Gauleiters.

When I came back from these journeys, I was called before Hitler at once. This was on the 29th of March, 1945. I had intentionally resisted his orders so openly, and I had discussed the lost war with so many of his Gauleiters so openly that my resistance had to become known to him. Witnesses are available from that period who knew that that is what I wanted to achieve.

I did not want to deceive him behind his back in this case. I wanted to put the alternative before him. At the beginning of the conference, he stated that he had had reports from Bormann showing that I considered the war as lost and that I had openly talked against his prohibition. He demanded that I should make a statement to the effect that I did not consider the war lost, and I replied by saying, "The war is lost".

He gave me 24 hours to think, and it was during those 24 hours that the letter was written, the extract from which hasbeen quoted, and which hasbeen submitted to the Tribunal.

After this reflection period, I intended to hand him this letter as my reply. But he refused to accept it. Thereupon, I declared to him that he could rely on me, even in the future. And by that means, I achieved it that he handed over to me once more the carrying out of the destruction work.

DR. FLECHSNER: In this connection, Mr. President, may I refer to Hitler's order dated the 30th of March, 1945, which the Tribunal will find on Pages 83 of the English text and 79 of the French text in the document book, which I now submit as Exhibit 28?

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Then, what did you order on the strength of this new order which you had?

A I had written the instructions, and it gave me the possibility to get around the destruction which had been ordered. I gave an order at once reestablishing all my old orders for the protection of industry. In this connection, I did not submit this new order of mine before Hitler, although it was expressly stated in his order, contrary to the promise which I had given him, namely that I would stand behind him unconditionally.

I left as early as the following day to see Seyss-Inquart, as it is stated here, and I said to him, too, that the war was lost. I then discussed the consequences fully. On that occasion I found a great deal of understanding from Seyss-Inquart. Both my decrees for the prevention of that destruction, as well asmy conferences, were contrary to the promise I had given Hitler on the 21st of March. I considered that this was my natural duty.

DR. FLEICHSNER: I submit under Speer Exhibit 29 the instructions issued by Speer on the 30th of March with reference to the order which has already been mentioned. In the French and German texts that appear on Page 81, and in the English document book, on Page 85.

THE WITNESS: In spite of this, the orders for the destruction of bridges still remained in force, and everywhere in Germany, Austria and Poland you can see the result today.

I made numerous journeys to the front, and I had many conferences with the commanders of the troops at the front. Perhaps that may have caused one relief or the others.

Finally, I achieved it that the chief of the communications troops, on the 3rd of April, 1945, stopped the destruction by means of a new order of the postal and wireless communication departments. Finally, on the 5th of April, I issued six OKW orders under the name of General Winter, who has been a witness in this court room; and these orders were to see to the preservation of important railway lines. The orders are still in existence. I gave these orders through my command channels and the channels of the Reich railway, and considering the tremendous muddle which there had been at the time, such orders, which I was not empowered to give, would at least have a distracting value.

BY DR. FLEICHSNER:

Q Mr. Speer, a number of attempts of yours to abbreviate the war became known to the press. Could you please refer to the problem, namely what has been hinted in the press, and state to the Tribunal what those were?

A I do not want to spend too much time on things which did not succeed. I tried repeatedly to exclude Himmler and others from the government and to force them to make themselves responsible for their deeds. To carry that and other plans out, eight officers from the front joined me, all of whom were holding the highest decorations. Amont them were the two best known pilots in Germany, Galland and Baumbach. The Secretary of State of the Propaganda Ministry made it possible for me on the 9th of April to speak briefly over the entire German radio system. All preparations were made, and at the last moment Goebbels heard about it and demanded that Hitler should pass on the text of my speech; so that I submitted to him a very changed text. But he even prohibited that.

On the 21st of April, 1945, it was possible for me first of all to record a speech at the broadcasting station at Hamburg, which was meant to be the instructions for the final phase; and the recording officials demanded that this speech should be broadcast only after Hitler's death, which would relieve them of their oath of allegiance to him.

Furthermore, I was in contact with the chief of staff of an army group in the East -- that is, the Army Group Weichsel -- and we were both aware that a fight for Berlin must not take place, and that contrary to their orders, the armies should by-pass Berlin.

To begin with, the order was carried out, but later there were several persons empowered with special authority by Hitler who succeeded in leading one division into Berlin. The original intention, however, that entire armies should be lead into Berlin, did not find itself carried through. The chief of staff with whom I had these conferences was General Kinsler.

Q In the end, did these attempts have any meaning in the beginning of April, and later on?

A Yes. We expected that the war would last longer, becamse Churchill, too, prophesied at the time that the end of the war would come at the end of July, 1945.

Q You have described here how much you did to preserve industrial plants and other economic installations. Did you act equally on behalf of the foreign workers?

A My responsibility was the industrial sector. I felt it my duty, therefore, in the first place, to hand over my sector undestroyed. In spite of this, several attempts of mine were in favor of foreign workers in Germany. In the first place, these foreign workers and prisoners of war, through the steps which I had taken to secure the food situation, were quire obviously the beneficiaries of my work during the last phase. Secondly, during local conversations, I did much to prevent detonations, contrary to the evacuation orders which were available from the Party, and I worked a remaining-on-the-spot of the foreign workers and prisoners, such conferences having taken place on the 18th of March in the Saar and on the 28th of March in the Ruhr.

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At the beginning of March, I made the proposal that five hundred thousand foreigners should be transferred from the Reich to the territories which we still held; that is to say, the Dutch to Holland the the Czechs to Czechoslovakia. The railways, however, refused to take responsibility for these transports, since the traffic system had already been so destroyed, that the carrying out of this plan was no longer possible. Finally, both in connection with the intended speech over the German broadcasting system on the 9th of April as well as the attempt of the Hamburg speech, I drew everyone's attention to the duties which we had towards the foreigners, the prisoners of war, and the detainees from concentration camps during this last phase.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President. may I draw your attention to page 88 of the English text in this connection; it is page 84 of the French and I submit it as Speer Exhibit No. 30.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q. Mr. Speer, you have described to us how much during the last phase of the war you were opposed to Hitler and his policies. Why did you not resign?

A. I had the possibility to resign on three occasions; one in April 1944, when my powers were considerably eliminated; the second time in September 1944, when Bormann and Goebbels were in favor of my being eliminated, by resigning; and the third time on the 29th of March 1945, Hitler himself demanded that I should go on permament leave, which was equivalent to resignation. I turned down all these possibilities because beginning with July 1944, I thought that it was my duty to remain at my post.

Q. There has been testimony in this courtroom to the effect that the last phase of the war, say beginning of January 1945, had been justified because unnecessary sacrifices should be made to save the nation. Were you of that same opinion?

A., No. It was said that military protection towards the East had been necessary to save refugees. In reality, until the middle of April 1945, the bulk of our last reserves of armored vehicles and munitions were used for the

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fight against the West. The tactical principle, therefore, was different from the one it should have been if the fight had been carried out with those aims, which has been testified to here. The destruction of bridges in the West and the destruction orders against the basis of life of the nation show the opposite. The sacrifices which were made on both sides after January 1945 were without sense. The dead of this period will be the accusers of the man responsible for the continuation of that fight, Adolf Hitler, just as much as the destroyed cities, destroyed in that last phase, who had lost tremendous cultural values and tremendous number of dwellings. Many of the difficulties under which the German nation is suffering today are due to the ruthless destruction of bridges, traffic installations, trucks and locomotives and ships, The German people remained faithful to Adolf Hitler until the end. He has betrayed them knowingly. He has tried to throw it into the abyss. Only after the 1st of May 1945, did Doenitz try to use reason and act but it was too late.

DR. FLAECHSNER: I have one last question.

BY DR. FLAECHSNER:

Q Was it possible for you to carry out your actions during the last phase of the war with your conceptions of faith and allegiance to Adolf Hitler?

A There is one faith which one must believe in always and that is always the faith towards one's own people. That duty must come above everything. If I standing in a leading position and if I see that the interests of the nation are acted against in such a way then I, too, must act. That Hitler had broken the faith to the nation, that must have been clear to every intelligent member of his surroundings and no later than January 1945, once Hitler was given the mission by his people, he had no right to combine and lose the destiny of the people with his own. That is why I found that it was necessary for me to do my natural duty as a German. I did not succeed in every way but I am glad today that with my work, I rendered the last service to the workers in Germany and the Occupied Territories.

DR. FLAECHSNER: Mr. President, I have now reached the end of my examination of the defendant Speer. May I perhaps draw the attention of the Tribunal to the following; namely, that with reference to the subjects which came up during this afternoon's session, there will be the witness Kehrl, or there is the witness Kehrl whose interrogatory has been referred in 10 and 12; Rohland, 5, 6, and 8; witness Schieber under 25; witness Guderian on the question, 1 to 3, 7 to 9, and with the same reference also under 6 and witness Stahl is mentioned under 1 and 2; the witness Kempf under No. 10. Still outstanding are the interrogatories from the witness Malzacher and the interrogatory which is most important to the defense, the statements of the witness von Pose, since he was the liaison man, the liaison officer between the General Staff of the Army and Speer's Ministry. Furthermore, still outstanding is the interrogatory referring to General Buhle, who was the Chief of the Army Staff, and Oberst Baumbach, General Baumbach, who was the commander of an airforce wing. The remaining documents I should submit at the end of the re-examination of the defendant Speer, to the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other defendants' counsel want to ask any questions?

DR. SERVATIUS: Dr. Servatius, counsel for Sauckel.

BY DR. SERVATIUS:

Q Mr. Witness, during the negotiations which Sauckel had in 1943 and 1944 with Laval in Paris, were there representatives present who came from your department and did they support Sauckel?

A During these conferences, representatives from my departments were partly present. They were present for the purpose of protecting the blocked restricted firms and also to see to it that there were no interferences with the production interests which I had proposed to protect.

Q So that these representatives were therefore not acting to help Sauckel's demands but they were against it?

A It wasn't the task for these representatives to act for or against Sauckel's demands because Sauckel stated his demands in such definite language that a smaller official was not in a position to speak either for or against these demandsin any way. This would have been a task which I would have had to carry out myself.

Q So that these representatives didn't fulfil any task, did they?

A My representatives were the representatives from the armament and later armament and war production in the Occupied Territories and as such, they had their special orders and their special tasks.

Q Mr. Witness, did you in 1943 act independently and without consultation with Sauckel, transfer fifty thousand French workers to the Ruhr?

A Yes, that is true. After the attack on the Moene Dam and the Eder Dam in April or May 1945, I went there and in that period I ordered that an action group from the Tdt organization should take over the restoration of these plants. The reason why I did it was because the machinery and the technical staff should be on the spot at once and this action group of the Todt organization first of all, without asking me, brought the French workers along which for us had tremendous repercussions in the West because the workers on the side of the Atlantic Wall who had up to that time felt safe from Sauckel's reach --

Q. Mr. Witness, we are not interested in hearing what was done. I am only interested in the fact that these 50,000 workers were obtained without Sauckel's agreement and by yourself independently, and that you have confirmed, haven't you?

A. Yes, that is true.

Q. Sauckel was responsible for the ruling on working hourse in these works, wasn't he? Is it known to you that the ten-hour day was later on ordered by Goebbels in his capacity as Plenipotentiary for Total Warfare, applicable to both Germans and foreign workers?

A. That is probably true. I am not directly recollecting it but I think it is right.

Q. Then you have stated that the Geneva Convention was not applied to Soviet prisoners of war and Italian civilian internees?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. Do you know that the Geneva Convention, although it was not recognized for Soveit prisoners of war, was nevertheless applied as far as meanings were concerned and that there were corresponding orders?

A. I can not give you an answer to that because that was too much detail and dealt with my department directly. I should like to confirm it for you.

DR. SERVATIUS: I shall later on submit a document to the Tribunal which will show this point.

BY DR. SERVATIUS:

Q. Do you know that Italian civilian internees -- let's say those who came from the Italian armed forces, were given free working conditions and that that was the reason why they didn't come under the Convention?

A. Yes, that is true and it was done by Sauckel's request.

Q. The responsibility for carrying out Sauckel's orders in the firms was up to the work leaders, isn't that right?

A. As far as they could be carried out, yes.

Q. And you have said that if, because of special events, the air attacks it wasn't possible to carry them out, that then the supreme authorities in the

Reich should have taken care of the matter?

A. Yes.

Q. Which authorities in the Reich do you mean?

A. The General Plenipotentiary for Labor.

Q. That would be Sauckel?

A. Yes. And the German Labor Front, who was responsible for accomodations and working conditions.

Q. Which organization did Sauckel have at his disposal to stop these shortcomings? After all, this was practical assistance that was wanted.

A. No, I think you have misunderstood me. The catasthropic conditions were conditions which were brought about by bombing. Nobody could remedy them, not with the best of desires, because every day there were new air attacks. But it isn't possible, as Sauckel has testified, that the work leader should be made responsible even for the fact that these conditions could not be stopped. I wanted to indicate that in such emergencies the leaders in their entirety must get together and they must decide whether ~~is~~ this is any longer a bearable state of affairs or not. In that connection, it was the special duty of Sauckel, as the reporting and causing official, that he should represent these needs.

Q. But then, who should he take it to?

A. To the Fuehrer.

Q. Mr. Witness, you have explained your own administration and you have said that you were an opponent of a bureauocratic administration. You had introduced self-administration for the firms, hadn't you, and on the professional side, you had formed expert agencies and above that committees and you were directing them, weren't you?

A. Yes.

Q. And then there was a closed administration which could not be penetrated from the outside by other authorities?

A. Yes, I would have represented that.

Q. Then you were the representative of these firms to the above --

A. Only as far as the technical tasks were concerned which I carried out.

Q. Please, will you describe the technical tasks?

A. Well, otherwise I would also have been responsible for food conditions or health conditions or matters which effected the police, but that was expecting too much. In that case I should have been given another part.

Q. Mr. Witness, weren't you referring to it earlier, that particularly as far as food was concerned, you had given instructions which the workers had the benefit of, and aren't you in that way confirming my view, that you should bear entire responsibility for that sector?

A. Not in the least. I believe that I took the action of the last phase within my entire responsibility, but not the individual responsibility for that sector?

A. Not in the least. I believe that I took the action of the last phase within my entire responsibility, but not the individual responsibilities which I had.

Q. Then, Witness, you have spoken about the responsibility of the Gauleiters as Reich Defense Commissioners with reference to the armament industries. Could you describe in detail what the scope of that responsibility was, because I just didn't understand it?

A. Since 1942, to an ever increasing degree, the responsibility transferred to the Gauleiters as Reich Defense Commissioners. This was the intention which mostly Bormann represented.

Q. What tasks did they have.

A. Just a minute. He desired the centralization of all the forces of the State and the Party in the Gaulieter. This state of affairs, the centralizing I mean, beginning in 1943, had almost been achieved in full, the only exception which still existed being my armament department, the so-called Armament Inspectorates, which, as they had previously come under the OKW, had remained military service departments which I had staffed, which, in turn, made it possible for me to remain outside the jurisdiction and influence on the part of the Gauleiters. But the Gauleiter was the central department in his Gau and he assumed the right to give orders if he didn't have them. The situation in our case was, as you very well know, that it wasn't a question of deciding who had the powers; it was a question of who would help themselves to the right to give orders. Just a minute. And in this case most Gauleiters did assume the rights and powers, all of them, by which means they were the responsible and centralized departments.

Q. What do you mean by "centralized departments"? Perhaps I may put something to you for a change. The Gauleiter, as Reich Defense Commissioner, only had the task of summarizing and centralizing certain authorities if a decision was necessary in the Gau. Take, for instanc the case of an air attack, the removal of the damage, construction of a new plant, so that the various departments would be brought to one conference table, but he did not have orders or rights to decide, is that right?

A. No; I should like to recommend to you that you should talk to a few Gaul eiters who will tell you how it was.

Q. In that case, I will drop the question. I will read the law. Mr. Witness, then you went on to say that during a certain period there had been a surplus of labor in Germany.

Was this due to the fact that Sauckel had brought too many foreign workers into Germany?

A In this case there may be the possibility of an error. My defense counsel has pointed to two documents, according to which, during the time from April, '42 until April, '43, Sauckel had supplied more labor to the armament sector than armament had requested. Is that the passage you mean?

Q I can only remember that you have said that there had been more workers than were required.

A Well then --

Q You don't want to say, therefore, that this had been brought about through the fact that Sauckel had brought too many workers in from foreign countries?

A No. I wanted to say by that answer that even according to Sauckel's opinion of the time and because of the demands to reach the top level that he was not caused, by these factors, to bring workers to Germany from France, because if, in a report to Hitler, he asserts that he had brought more workers to the Armament sector than I had demanded, which is what you can see from the letter, then it becomes clear that he has done more than I wanted him to do. The facts, however, were different. In fact, he didn't supply these workers at all, and we had quite a row because it was my opinion that he had supplied less and he had made a terrific report to Hitler; but of course during this trial the document is valid.

Q You have just pointed out also that there had been the question of an argument between you and Sauckel regarding the question of whether there were sufficient labor reserves in Germany, and if I have understood you rightly, then you said that if workers were brought to work in the manner used by England and the Soviet Union, then one wouldn't have needed any foreign workers at all; is that true?

A No, I didn't say that.

Q Well then, hiw am I to understand it?

A I have expressed quite clearly enough that I consider Sauckel's policy, labor policy of bringing foreigners into Germany -- it was considered right by me. I did not try to dodge that responsibility, but there were considerable reserves of German labor and there again is only proof for the fact that I wasn't responsible for the high level of the demands which were made, and that was all I wanted to prove.

Q Are the laws known to you according to which German women and youth were used to a very considerable degree?

A Yes.

Q Do you also know that officers' wives or the wives of high officials also had to work in factories?

A Yes, beginning in August, 1944.

Q Well then, where were these labor reserves of which you are speaking?

A I was talking about the period 1943. In 1943 I demanded, in the Central Planning Board, that the German labor reserve should be drawn upon, and in '44, during the 4th of January conversation, I said the same thing. Sauckel at that time stated in his speech, and his ppeech of the 1st of March, 1944, shows it, which I have submitted as a document, that there were no longer any reserves of German workers, but at the same time he also testified here that he had succeeded, in 1944, to still mobilize 2,000,000 workers from German sources, and that, according to the conference we had with Hitler on the 1st of January, 1944, appeared impossible to us. He himself has proved here that at a time when I desired the use of internal labor, he didn't think that this fact existed but that he was later forced, through circumstances in the blocked firms, to use and mobilize these workers from Germany after all; so that therefore my statement at the time was right.

Q Mr. Witness, these two million workers you have mentioned, were they people who could be used in industry ?

A Yes, of course.

Q Were they used directly as experts in industry ?

A No, they had first of all to be trained.

Q Didn't they first of all have to go through complicated transfers from one firm to the other which would make them free ?

A Only partly, because we did have the possibility of using them in the fine mechanical industry and other firms, and this is something which everyone knows who knows American and British industry, that the modern machines are perfectly suitable to be worked by women, even for serious and difficult work.

THE PRESIDENT : The Tribunal isn't interested in all these details, Dr. Servatius.

DR. SERVATIUS : Mr. President, a principal question in which I am very interested is whether there was a surplus of workers from foreign countries, and if, therefore, there wasn't any necessity for the state to get them. That question is of the greatest importance from the point of view of international law. That is the thing I wish to clarify.

I have two more questions and perhaps I may put them now.

THE PRESIDENT : Yes, you can put two more questions, but not on those details.

DR. SERVATIUS : No, it is something different.

BY DR. SERVATIUS :

Q Witness, you have stated that your attempt to subordinate yourself to Sauckel failed. Didn't you achieve that subordination in practice by the fact that on the medium of the center level Sauckel's department would have to do what your armament commission ordered ?

A No. I am afraid I shall have to go into broad detail before you can understand my answer.

Q But then you have said no, haven't you ?

A These are entirely mew conceptions which I should have to explain, but if my answer "no" is sufficient for you, splendid.

Q Well, there is no need for any lengthy statement, because if you clearly say no, that is enough.

Mr. Witness, one last question. You said that Sauckel had discussed and deciced the question of distributing labor within his labor staff. He, on the other hand, says that the Fuehrer had made certain decisions.

Mustn't one draw the dividing line between the considerable demands of a program where one is dealing with the distribution of labor for a lengthy period, and the distribution which was carried out currently, taking into consideration the demands of the program of the time ?

A According to my recollection, and also on the strength of the copies of the Fuehrer conferences which I had, you must divide this question into two phases, one ending October 1942, during which there were frequent joint conferences with Hitler during which Sauckel and I were present. During these conferences, the distribution of labor was discussed with reference to the individual months in detail. After that time, there were no longer further conferences with Hitler in my presence, which would go into detail. I merely know of the conference of January 1944, and then there was another conference in April or May 1944 which, however, I have mentioned.

During those conferences, there was only a general decision and the distribution in detail was then carried out in accordance with the directive by Sauckel.

Q But that is just what I am asking you. These were demands based on a program. They were principle decisions, saying, for instance, "Two million workers will have to be got from foreign countries," and then the subsequent distribution was carried out by Sauckel.

A Yes, that's right, and I can go on to confirm Sauckel's testimony, saying that he always got his orders from Hitler with reference to the occupied territories, since he needed Hitler's authority to assert Himself in foreign territory.

DR. SERVATIUS : In that case, Mr. President, I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT : The Tribunal will adjourn.

(The Tribunal adjourned until 21 June 1946 at 1000 hours.)